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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In April 2014, computer security experts revealed “Heartbleed,” a 
vulnerability in software encrypting information transmitted over the 
Internet.1 The bug existed in OpenSSL, which up to two-thirds of 
websites use to encrypt Internet traffic.2 Heartbleed exposed large 
swaths of data to interception and exploitation. Initially, news stories 
speculated the U.S. government knew about Heartbleed, and, rather 
than disclosing it, had been using it or keeping it for intelligence or 
other purposes, leaving Internet users at risk.3 
 Although the Heartbleed speculation seems to have been 
unfounded, public concerns about Heartbleed, combined with distrust 
created by Edward Snowden’s disclosures about the National Security 
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1 Nicole Perlroth, Experts Find a Door Ajar in an Internet Security Method Thought Safe, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/flaw-found-in-key-
method-for-protecting-data-on-the-internet/. 
 
2 Id.; The Heartbleed Bug, CODENOMICON (Apr. 2014), http://heartbleed.com/. 
 
3 Michael Riley, NSA Said to Exploit Heartbleed Bug for Intelligence for Years, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-
have-used-heartbleed-bug-exposing-consumers.html. 
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Agency (NSA), forced the U.S. government to detail4  how it deals with 
software vulnerabilities it knows about but that remain unknown to 
software vendors or users – “zero-day” vulnerabilities or “zero-days.”5 
The Obama administration’s response to Heartbleed raised further 
questions about U.S. policy on zero-day vulnerabilities, including the 
U.S. government’s role in purchasing vulnerabilities from the zero-day 
market. 
 The legal and illicit trade in zero-days is lucrative and global. The 
U.S. government is a buyer, with the NSA devoting $25.1 million to 
“covert purchases of software vulnerabilities” from private vendors 
during fiscal year 2013, corresponding to an estimated minimum of 
100 to 625 vulnerabilities annually.6 Israel, Britain, Russia, India, 
Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, and Iran purchase zero-
days.7 Countries can use zero-day vulnerabilities for law enforcement 
investigations, improving cyber defenses, conducting cyber espionage, 
and conducting offensive military cyber operations. 
 The U.S. government’s participation in this market raises concerns 
because keeping zero-days secret to preserve military, intelligence, or 
law enforcement capabilities can negatively affect U.S. and global 
cybersecurity. In purchasing vulnerabilities to use or stockpile rather 
than disclose, governments prioritize national security, law 
enforcement, and intelligence objectives over general Internet 
security.  The U.S. government denied prior knowledge of Heartbleed, 
but the policy issued in response to this vulnerability did not rule out 
that, had the government known about Heartbleed, it would have kept 
this bug secret and exploited it.8 This possibility worries those 
 
 
 
 
4 Michael Daniel, Heartbleed: Understanding When We Disclose Cyber Vulnerabilities, 
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/04/28/ 
heartbleed-understanding-when-we-disclose-cyber-vulnerabilities. 
 
5 See Part II.A infra for a detailed description of zero-days. 
6 Stefan Frei, The Known Unknowns: Empirical Analysis of Publicly Known Security 
Vulnerabilities, NSS LABS (Dec. 2013), https://www.nsslabs.com/reports/known-
unknowns-0, at 15; Barton Gellman & Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Spy Agencies Mounted 231 
Offensive Cyber-operations in 2011, Documents Show, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-
offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-
b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html. 
 
7 Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer 
Code, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/ 
world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html. 
8 Riley, supra note 3. 
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concerned with this policy’s effect on U.S. national security, Internet 
security, and the future of cyberspace. Stockpiling and not disclosing 
vulnerabilities could leave global computer users, companies, and 
other countries at risk. The global nature of the zero-day market also 
means this trade could enable unfriendly governments, non-state 
actors, and criminals to gain capabilities damaging to U.S. interests 
and abuse human rights and civil liberties.9 
 The negative security implications, lucrative nature, and global 
scope of the zero-day vulnerability trade have sparked debate about 
whether to regulate it. Some civil liberties advocates have suggested 
regulation,10 and parts of the government have called for greater 
analysis.11  However, many zero-day sellers oppose regulation.12 The 
debate exhibits disagreements about whether a problem exists, let 
alone how to address it. Further, as discussed below, despite the 
market’s global reach, no international institution seems prepared to 
address this issue.  
 The debate’s divisiveness indicates that serious policy questions 
exist about the zero-day trade and its implications for U.S. national 
security, cybersecurity, and international relations more broadly. 
Recognizing that the debate has reached no consensus, this article 
analyzes potential domestic and international strategies for regulating 
the zero-day trade, exploring their substantive content, feasibility, and 
possible consequences. Regulation need not necessarily mean banning 
sale and/or use of zero-days. The strategies range across the spectrum 
of regulatory approaches, including consideration of how existing laws 
already have regulatory effects on the zero-day trade. A number of the 
strategies examined connect to established governance frameworks 
used with other dual-use technologies. In examining potential 
 
 
 
 
9 Eric Rosenbach, Keynote Address at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics 
Cyber Con 2013 (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4390789/keynote-
address-eric-rosenbach, at 3:24. 
10 Electronic Frontier Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
No. 3:14-cv-03010 (N. D. Cal. 2014); Expert Warns of the Growing Trade in Software 
Security Exploits, HARV. L. TODAY (Oct. 30, 2012), http://today.law.harvard.edu /expert-
warns-of-the- growing-trade-in-software-security-exploits/?redirect=1. 
11 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 924; 
Rosenbach, supra note 9.  
12 See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List for Hacker’s Secret 
Software Exploits, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/ 
2012/03/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret-software-exploits/ 
(“That’ll work just as well at eliminating exploits as the war on drugs has worked at 
eliminating drugs.”). 
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strategies, this article scrutinizes how well each option addresses the 
security problems associated with the zero-day trade and its 
feasibility, given the foreseeable course of national and international 
politics. 
 First, the article examines the scale and security implications of 
the zero-day trade. Little academic work has been completed on the 
zero-day issue, so I conducted on-and off-the-record interviews with 
government, academic, civil society, and private sector experts to 
obtain perspectives on this issue.  Next, the article investigates 
domestic regulatory approaches, including criminalization, export 
controls, and increased oversight of U.S. government actions. It 
concludes that increased executive branch oversight is the best 
domestic strategy.  The article then analyzes international strategies: 
international legal approaches, voluntary collective action through 
coordinated export controls, and cooperation through collective 
defense organizations. It concludes that voluntary collective action to 
harmonize export controls on zero-days through the Wassenaar 
Arrangement is the most feasible international option.  
 
II. WHAT IS THE ZERO-DAY PROBLEM? 
A. Zero-Day Vulnerabilities  
 A zero-day vulnerability is a previously unknown flaw in a 
computer program that exposes the program to external 
manipulation. Zero-day vulnerabilities have been found in many 
programs, including Microsoft, Internet Explorer, Adobe, and Apple 
products.13 Zero-day vulnerabilities also appear in software running 
critical infrastructure, such as power plants. What differentiates a 
zero-day from other computer vulnerabilities, and what makes it 
valuable, is that it is unknown to the software’s makers and users. 
Whoever has knowledge of a zero-day can exploit it from the “zero-th” 
day of its discovery, until the software maker or users learn of it and 
fix the vulnerability.  
  What makes a zero-day vulnerability different from other cyber 
tools is that it is simply information.  A zero-day encapsulates the 
knowledge that X could happen if you do Y.  As Auriemma and 
Ferrante of ReVuln, a zero-day seller, argue, “we don’t sell weapons, 
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we sell information.”14 Other companies, however, do sell weaponized 
vulnerabilities – zero-day “exploits” – that contain new software code 
taking advantage of a zero-day vulnerability. Desautels, of 
vulnerability-seller Netragard, states Netragard sells exploits.15 Zero-
day exploits range in complexity and functionality, from enabling 
access to, monitoring, extracting information from, or damaging a 
software program. For instance, the Stuxnet program allegedly used 
by the United States to damage uranium-enrichment Iranian 
centrifuges made use of four zero-day vulnerabilities.16 
 In this article, the term zero-day “vulnerability” describes the 
software flaw itself. When a zero-day vulnerability is sold, knowledge 
of the flaw is sold.  The press often uses the term zero-day “exploit” 
interchangeably to describe knowledge of a flaw or new software code 
exploiting a flaw.  In this article, the term “exploit” refers only to new 
code written to take advantage of a zero-day vulnerability. Although 
turning a vulnerability into an exploit can be relatively easy, 
motivations for finding and exploiting vulnerabilities often differ. For 
instance, cybersecurity researchers have less motivation to turn 
vulnerabilities into exploits than someone selling or buying zero-days.  
This distinction between a zero-day vulnerability and exploit, and the 
different groups interacting with them, is important to make when 
analyzing regulatory options for the zero-day vulnerability trade.17 
 Vulnerabilities are most exploitable if kept secret. Zero-days are 
discovered and not made, so there is no guarantee someone in 
possession of a vulnerability is the only person who knows about it. 
The value of secrecy complicates efforts to control the zero-day trade 
 
 
 
 
14 Joseph Menn, Special Report: U.S. Cyberwar Strategy Stokes Fear of Blowback, 
REUTERS (May 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-usa-
cyberweapons-specialreport-idUSBRE9490EL20130510. 
15 The Digital Arms Trade, ECONOMIST (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
business/ 21574478-market-software-helps-hackers-penetrate-computer-systems-digital-
arms-trade. 
 
16 David Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-
wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html. The Symantec report details three zero-days in 
Stuxnet, while news reports have indicated four were used. 
17 The press does not always distinguish between zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits. 
After assessing context for each use, I refer to all zero-days as vulnerabilities –  knowledge 
of a software flaw – rather than exploits, unless I could verify otherwise.  This assumption 
may introduce error: prices, actors, and policy recommendations may vary between 
vulnerabilities and exploits. Where possible, I point out how dealing with a vulnerability or 
exploit may differ. 
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because it contributes to market opacity and lack of transparency 
about buyer and seller behavior. 
 
B. Overview of Vulnerability Markets 
 Zero-days are traded in three markets. As defined in this article, 
the “white market” encompasses sales of vulnerabilities between zero-
day vulnerability hunters and software vendors or third-party 
clearinghouses.  The “black market” describes interactions where the 
buyer or the seller has criminal intent. The “gray market” involves 
interactions between vulnerability sellers and government agencies, 
conducted as legal business deals.  It also encompasses sales between 
vulnerability sellers and legal users of zero-day vulnerabilities, 
including high-end cybersecurity firms. This article distinguishes 
between “legal” and “legitimate” zero-day vulnerability markets.  
White-market and gray-market transactions are legal, and black 
market transactions illegal.  The negative security ramifications of the 
gray market mean this article designates only white-market options 
legitimate. 
 Gray-market firms, rather than freelance hackers, now sell more than 
half of zero-day vulnerabilities.18 NSS Labs included many of the firms I 
identify in Table 1 in its market analysis, and concluded that “half a dozen 
boutique exploit providers have the capacity to offer more than 100 
exploits per year, resulting in 85 privately known exploits being available 
on any given day,” at minimum.19 One seller identified the decreased risk 
of getting ripped off, the possibility of job offers, and stable contracts with 
government or industry clients as reasons vulnerability hunters choose to 
operate on the gray market.20 The scale and function of each market is 
discussed in detail later in the paper. 
 
C. Security Implications of the Global Gray-Market Trade in Zero-
Day Vulnerabilities  
 
 The gray market for zero-days causes concern beyond its size and 
global reach. The gray market also raises national and international 
 
 
 
 
18 Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15. 
19 Frei, supra note 6, at 2. 
20 Lily Ablon, Martin Libicki, and Andrea A. Golay, Markets for Cybercrime Tools and 
Stolen Data: Hackers’ Bazaar, RAND CORPORATION (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html, at 25. 
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security worries. The zero-day issue, particularly U.S. government 
participation in the trade and its policies towards disclosure, is an 
instance where national security and broader cybersecurity needs may 
conflict. According to the Obama administration, if the U.S. 
government discovers a zero-day vulnerability, it has a “bias” towards 
disclosure.21  What “bias” means is unclear. U.S. policy makes 
exceptions to this bias, providing opportunities for the government to 
keep vulnerabilities without notifying software vendors.22 Keeping 
vulnerabilities secret means other governments or cyber criminals 
may independently discover and use the vulnerability to the detriment 
of general cybersecurity.23  These concerns were evident with 
Heartbleed: computer users would have been at risk if the U.S. 
government had known about the vulnerability and chosen to keep it 
secret for exploitation. U.S. non-disclosure of zero-days also leaves 
global users at risk, because undisclosed vulnerabilities affect anyone 
using globally disseminated software. 
 Government participation helps catalyze gray-market expansion, 
which has potentially harmful ramifications. Vulnerability sellers may 
offer information to multiple sources. The U.S. government’s 
willingness to purchase vulnerabilities has spurred growth of 
vulnerability-selling firms, encouraging gray-market expansion and 
increasing availability and mobility of gray-market products, which 
actors unfriendly to the U.S. may be able to access.  Soghoian, a 
cybersecurity expert at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
states that, “as soon as one of these weaponized zero-days sold to 
governments is obtained by a ‘bad guy’ and used to attack U.S. 
infrastructure” bad things will happen; gray-market sellers “will drag 
the entire security industry into a world of pain.”24 
 Even without duplicitous vulnerability sellers, the very nature of 
zero-days means they could independently find their way into the 
hands of both the U.S. government and bad actors. Howard Schmidt, 
former White House cybersecurity coordinator, explained that, “it’s 
 
 
 
 
21 Daniel, supra note 5. 
22 For full details, see discussion of the Michael Daniel blog post in part III.D.2.E infra. 
23 Menn, supra note 14; In Cyberwar, Software Flaws Are a Hot Commodity, NPR (Feb. 
12, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/12/171737191/in-cyberwar-software-flaws-are-a-
hot-commodity.  
24 Greenberg, supra note 12. 
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pretty naïve to believe that with a newly discovered zero-day, you are 
the only one ... that’s discovered it.”25  
 Government participation in the gray market could affect the black 
market. U.S. involvement in the gray market “bankroll[s] dangerous 
R&D” and “build[s] the black market,” a U.S. military-intelligence 
official stated.26 Michael Hayden, former Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and NSA Director, argues that tax dollars used to purchase 
vulnerabilities on the gray market may benefit the black market – for 
instance, if spent with a company that also supplies bad actors.27 Or, a 
buyer participates in the gray market using a front company, but is 
actually a criminal organization. This crossover effect exists in the 
traditional arms trade, where legitimate arms transfers end up with 
renegade groups.28  
 A robust gray market expands access to advanced cyber tools to 
states that would otherwise not be able to independently develop 
them. Before the gray market, the ability to discover zero-days in-
house was largely a boutique capability, the privilege of a few capable 
governments or those with access to skilled hackers.29  Colonel John 
Adams, head of the Marine Corps’ Intelligence Integration Division, 
states that gray-market sellers “provide cyber-power to hostile 
governments that would otherwise lack the expertise to attack an 
advanced country’s computer systems.”30   
 Easier access to zero-days by non-state actors is also a security 
concern. Eric Rosenbach, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Cyber Policy, said that the prospect of non-state actors accessing zero-
days on the market “keeps me awake at night.”31  In acquiring zero-
days, the United States may inadvertently enable a market that also 
allows less cyber-capable nations and non-state actors unfriendly to 
U.S. interests to improve their cyber capabilities.  
 Concerns that zero-days can contribute to human rights abuses 
 
 
 
 
25 Menn, supra note 14. 
26 Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15. 
27 Menn, supra note 14. 
28 Nicholas Marsh, Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small 
Arms, 4 J. WORLD AFF. 217 (2002). 
29 Morgan Marquis-Boire, For Their Eyes Only: The Commercialization of Digital Spying, 
CITIZEN LAB (May 1, 2013), https://citizenlab.org/2013/04/for-their-eyes-only-2/, at 2. 
30 Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15. 
31 Rosenbach, supra note 9. 
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have also emerged. As established, the gray market may enable bad 
actors, including oppressive governments, to acquire cyber 
capabilities they can use to violate human rights. For instance, since 
September 2013, a vulnerability in Adobe Flash, publicly disclosed in 
April 2014, was used to target Syrians who visited a government 
“complaints” website.32 This bug appears to have been professionally 
planned and executed.33 This situation demonstrates that concerns 
about connections between human rights abuses and zero-days are 
real. European Union politician Marietje Schaake has advocated 
regulating trade in such cyber technologies that could be used to 
abuse human rights.34  
 
D. Detailed Look at Vulnerability Markets  
1. White-Market Programs 
 In early bug-hunting days, hackers who discovered bugs could 
either alert the vendor in return for recognition and free company 
gear or turn to the black market. White-market purchasing programs 
emerged as a third option in the mid-2000s, when companies and 
independent organizations began offering bounties for bugs.  For 
example, in 2005, a group of “white hat” hackers started the 
TippingPoint Zero Day Initiative (ZDI). This initiative compensated 
researchers for reporting bugs to ZDI. ZDI would then notify affected 
vendors. The typical ZDI award was $1,000-5,000, with most below 
$2,000. Another similar initiative was the VeriSign iDefense 
 
 
 
 
32 Dennis Fisher, Flash Zero-Day Used to Target Victims in Syria, THREATPOST – 
KASPERSKY LABS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://threatpost.com/flash-zero-day-used-to-target-
victims-in-syria. 
 
33 Recent security analyses have tied this April 2014 vulnerability to a wider surveillance 
operation also targeting other countries, likely originating from a Francophone country; 
some have implicated France. This finding complicates linking the incident directly to the 
Syrian government. Still, someone was conducting surveillance of Syrian “complainers” 
using a zero-day vulnerability. See Franceschi-Biccherai, Lorenzo, Meet Casper: Yet 
Another Malware Likely Created by France for Surveillance. MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 5, 
2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/meet-casper-yet-another-malware-likely-
created-by-france-for-surveillance. 
34 Ryan Gallagher, The Secretive Hacker Market for Software Flaws, SLATE MAG. (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/ future_tense/2013/01/ 
zero_day_exploits_should_the_hacker_gray_market_be_regulated.html. 
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Vulnerability Contributor Program (VCP), started in 2002.35  The VCP 
also compensates researchers for reporting vulnerabilities and then 
coordinates with vendors to patch them. A new player is HackerOne, 
which operates as a middleman between software companies and 
flaw-finders, orchestrating paid deals.36  
 Even though compensation by vulnerability purchasing programs 
is lower than black market prices, these programs constitute a 
substantial source of bug reports. One study reports 14 percent of all 
Microsoft, 10 percent of Apple, and 17 percent of Adobe vulnerabilities 
in the past decade came through white-market programs.37 Many 
software companies also offer their own bug bounties, including: 
 
 Facebook, offering rewards from $500 up, spending $1 
million in the first two years of the program; 38 
 
 Google, offering $100 to $20,000 in rewards, with 
most rewards around $1000; 39  
 
 Microsoft, which has a newly expanded bounty up to 
$150,000 for certain bugs, potentially in response to 
gray-market pricing; 40 and 
 
 Mozilla, averaging about $3000 per bug.41 
 
 
 
 
35 Defense Vulnerability Contributor Program, VERISIGN IDEFENSE VENDOR-COORDINATED 
PUBLIC VULNERABILITY REPORTS (2013), http://www.verisigninc.com/ en_GB/cyber-
security/ security-intelligence/vulnerability-reports/index.xhtml. 
 
36 Joseph Menn, HackerOne Gets $9 Million in Funding to Reward Spotters of Software 
Flaws, REUTERS (May 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/ 
cybersecurity-bounties-idUSL1N0OE2CI20140528?irpc=932. 
37 Frei, supra note 6, at 10. 
38 Facebook.com/whitehat, FACEBOOK (2013), https://www.facebook.com/whitehat; An 
Update on Our Bug Bounty Program, FACEBOOK (Aug. 2, 2013), https:// 
www.facebook.com / notes/facebook-security/an-update-on-our-bug-bounty-
program/10151508163265766. 
 
39 Vulnerability Reward Program, GOOGLE (2013), https://www.google.com/about/ 
appsecurity/reward-program/. 
 
40 Microsoft Bounty Programs, MICROSOFT SEC. TECH CTR. (June 26, 2013), 
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/dn425036. 
41 Frei, supra note 6, at 13. 
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Google, frustrated by reliance on insecure code from other companies, 
has launched Project Zero, its own in-house team of vulnerability 
hunters searching for bugs in Google and other software.42 No money 
appears to be exchanged through Project Zero, but Google gives other 
companies 60 to 90 days before publicly releasing details of 
discovered vulnerabilities.  
 
2. Black-Market Programs 
 The black market is a long-standing option for profiting from zero-
day vulnerabilities. In the black market, zero-days and other tools are 
available for purchase on widely accessible sites and restricted-access 
marketplaces.43 Sellers include freelance hackers and organizations.44 
Black-market buyers include individual criminals and criminal 
organizations.45 Some governments may turn to the black market if 
legitimate sellers refuse to service them. 
 Black-market trade is largely conducted online, including bulletin-
board style forums, email, and chat rooms.46 Recently, Amazon-type 
stores have developed, allowing buyers to shop without direct 
interaction with the vulnerability provider.47 Radianti identified at 
least twelve publicly accessible black-market forums.48 Radianti’s 
interviews with black-market participants reveal that prices are higher 
on black markets than the white market.49 One subject described a 
sale where a bug would go for $2500 on the white but $30,000 on the 
 
 
 
 
42 Andy Greenberg, Meet ‘Project Zero,’ Google’s Secret Team of Bug-Hunting Hackers, 
WIRED (June 15, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/google-project-zero/. 
 
43 Ablon, Libicki, and Golay, supra note 20, at 8; Charles Miller, The Legitimate 
Vulnerability Market: Inside the Secretive World of 0-day Exploit Sales, WORKSHOP ON 
THE ECON. OF INFO. SEC. (2007), http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/29.pdf. 
 
44 Ablon, Libicki, and Golay, supra note 20, at 4. 
45 Id. at 5-6. 
46 Id. at 7. 
47 Id. at 7. 
48 Jaziar Radianti, Eliot Rich, & Jose Gonzalez, Vulnerability Black Markets: Empirical 
Evidence and Scenario Simulation, 42ND HAWAII INT’L CONFERENCE ON SYS. SCI. (2009). 
 
49 Jaziar Radianti, Eliciting Information on the Vulnerability Black Market from 
Interviews, IEEE FOURTH INT’L CONFERENCE ON EMERGING SEC. INFO., SYS., & TECH. 
(2010). 
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black market.50 Other interview subjects described an Adobe Acrobat 
bug sold for $75,000, a Windows Meta File vulnerability purchased 
for $4,000, and an Internet Explorer 7 bug acquired for $15,000.51  
Clearly, prices vary according to bug type and potential. Radianti 
documented at least one case of a seller criticizing a black-market 
offer by comparing it to a higher white market offer.52 Radianti 
concluded that the legitimate market provides bargaining power to 
black-market sellers.53  It also demonstrates that black-market sellers 
are aware of, or operate simultaneously on, illegal and legal markets. 
 
3. Gray-Market Programs 
 The gray market refers to trade between vulnerability sellers and 
government agencies or other non-criminal clients. Potential buyers of 
gray-market zero days include private-sector clients, brokers who 
resell vulnerabilities, and governments.54 Private-sector clients 
typically include high-end penetration testing firms, but this customer 
base is considered much smaller than the government base.55 
Governmental buyers are the most typical final customers for zero-
days in the gray market, but zero-days often first pass through 
brokers. 
 The U.S. government is a reported buyer of zero-day 
vulnerabilities.  According to the intelligence budget leaked by 
Snowden, the NSA devoted $25.1 million in fiscal year 2013 to 
purchase software vulnerabilities from private vendors, despite 
relying on in-house staff for most vulnerabilities.56 The NSA is the 
only publicly identified U.S. government purchaser.  Reuters reported 
that the Department of Defense (DoD) and other intelligence agencies 
participate in the gray market but provided no specifics.57 In the 
 
 
 
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Radianti, Rich, & Gonzalez, supra note 48. 
54 Ablon, Libicki, & Golay, supra note 20, at 25-26. 
55 Telephone Interview with Richard Bejtlich, Chief Security Strategist, FireEye, (May 7, 
2014). 
56 Gellman & Nakashima, supra note 6. 
 
57 Menn, supra note 14. 
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absence of other information, the following suggestions represent 
informed guesses about government agency participants. Possible 
candidates include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), based on 
zero-day usefulness to intelligence and the recent creation of a CIA 
digital directorate, and non-NSA parts of the DoD, given its 
intelligence-gathering responsibilities and role in coordinating 
military cyber operations through U.S. Cyber Command 
(CYBERCOM).58 The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are also possible 
purchasers, given their roles in law enforcement, intelligence 
gathering, and cybersecurity policy. The FBI appears to stockpile and 
use zero-day vulnerabilities, but no information currently establishes 
the FBI as a buyer.59 
 Private-sector companies purchasing vulnerabilities on the gray 
market fall into two categories: companies reselling vulnerabilities, 
usually to governments, and companies using vulnerabilities for 
purposes such as cyber defense research or penetration testing.60  
Contractors such as Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Harris 
Corporation, and Raytheon are likely buyers/resellers.61 These 
contractors may also have their own vulnerability discovery teams 
selling directly to the government.  
 Miller predicted commercial cyber tool suppliers, large 
penetration testing and consulting firms, intrusion detection 
companies, and security subscription services also buy vulnerabilities 
on the gray market.62  Besides actions like penetration testing, the 
legality of industry use of vulnerabilities is contested, and some 
vulnerability sellers refuse to offer their most sensitive products to the 
private sector. 
                                                                                                                   
 
58 DAVID SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF 
AMERICAN POWER 200-01 (2012). 
 
59 Michael Riley & Chris Strohm, FBI Keeps Internet Flaws Secret to Defend Against 
Hackers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-30/fbi-
keeps-internet-flaws-secret-to-defend-against-hackers.html. 
60 Ablon, Libicki, & Golay, supra note 20, at 25. 
61 Thomas Brewster, Words of War and Weakness: The Zero-Day Exploit Market, 
TECHWEEKEUROPE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/zero-day-
exploit-vulnerabilties-cyber-war-91964. 
62 Miller, supra note 43. 
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 Brokers source vulnerabilities from vulnerability finders and offer 
them to potential customers for a 10-15 percent cut of the final sale.63 
For example, Miller agreed to give a broker 10 percent in return for 
access to multiple potential government clients and subsequently 
received offers of $10,000 and $80,000.64  
 In addition, the gray market is global, with the governments of 
Israel, Britain, Russia, India, and Brazil identified as purchasers.65  
North Korea and Middle Eastern intelligence services are on the 
market, including Malaysia, Singapore, and the Revolutionary Guards 
of Iran.66 Most well-financed intelligence agencies probably purchase 
vulnerabilities.67  
 Excluding contractors and brokers, this research identified ten 
independent gray market zero-day vulnerability sellers, listed in Table 
1 below, along with their known business practices.  This table only 
includes entities whose participation could be verified using at least 
two sources: two news articles or a news article and the company’s 
website.  This table is not exhaustive or definitive. It represents 
companies willing to speak to the press or otherwise indicate their 
activities and which operate primarily in English. Errata Security took 
issue with sources indicating it is a seller.68 However, the company has 
not publicly denied participation, so until public sources indicate 
otherwise, Errata will remain listed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
63 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7; Brewster, supra note 61. 
64 Miller, supra note 43. 
65 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7. 
66 Id. 
67 Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15. 
68 Robert Graham, 0day Market Conspiracy Theories, ERRATA SECURITY (June 25, 2014), 
http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/06/0day-market-conspiracy-theories.html. 
2015] FIDLER 419 
 
Table 1: Zero-Day Sellers 
Entity Location 
Self-
Imposed 
Selling 
Restrictions
Pricing Notes Broker 
Headquarters Outside United States 
VUPEN
69  
Montpelier, 
France  
- Fort Meade, 
MD 
- Does not sell
to countries 
under 
European 
Union, United 
States or 
United 
Nations 
restrictions. 
- Only sells to 
government 
clients. 
- $100,000 
subscription fee 
- Per flaw charge 
- 1.2 million 
revenue in 2011  
- Confirmed 
contract for some 
form of vulnerability 
service with United 
States Government. 
-86% of sales 
outside France.  
Maybe 
ReVuln
70 Malta   
- Vulnerabilities not 
disclosed to 
companies. 
- Offers SCADA 
vulnerabilities. 
Maybe 
Arc4dia
71 
Quebec 
- Sells to
“national 
governments, 
foreign 
intelligence 
services, and 
other lawful 
agencies.”  
- Only sells to 
government 
agencies.  
   
 
 
 
 
69 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7; Brian Fung, The NSA Hacks Other Countries By 
Buying Millions of Dollars’ Worth of Computer Vulnerabilities, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/31/the-nsa-hacks-
other-countries-by-buying-millions-of-dollars-worth-of-computer-vulnerabilities/; NSA-
Vupen Contract, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY ( Sept. 9, 2013); Gallagher, supra note 34. 
 
70 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7; ReVuln, REVULN (2013), http://revuln.com/. 
 
71 Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15; Arc4dia, ARC4DIA (2013), 
http://arc4dia.com/company.html. 
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Headquarters Inside United States 
Exodus 
Intelligence72 
Austin, 
TX 
All 
vulnerabilities 
are 
responsibly 
reported to 
companies.  
-Top 4
contributors 
receive $20,000 
bonus  
- In its first six 
weeks, it 
purchased 12 
vulnerabilities 
(20% of 
submissions) 
-Sells a feed of 
information relating 
to vulnerabilities. 
- Network of 150 
contributing 
researchers. 
Yes 
Endgame73 
Arlington, 
VA 
In March 
2014, 
Endgame 
announced it 
would no 
longer sell 
exploits, but 
would 
continue 
selling 
vulnerabilities 
to 
governments. 
- $100,000  
- 200,000 for 
best products 
- Package of 25 
zero-days for 2.5 
million  
- Links to In-Q-Tel. 
- Former NSA 
director as investor. 
- Recently raised 
$23 million in 
second-round 
funding. 
Maybe 
Netragard74 Acton, MA 
- Strictly U.S.-
based 
customers. 
- Screening 
procedures for 
contractors. 
 
- $16,000-
250,000 
- 50 zero-days 
sold in 2012  
Contracts with 3-
dozen independent 
suppliers. 
Yes 
Errata 
Security75  
Atlanta, 
GA     
 
 
 
 
72 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7; EIP August Incentives, EXODUS INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 7, 
2012), http://blog.exodusintel.com/page/2; Brewster, supra note 61. 
 
73 Andy Greenberg, A Second Act for the Blackwater of Hacking, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/02/12/inside-endgame-a-new-
direction-for-the-blackwater-of-hacking/; Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7; Menn, supra 
note 14; Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15; Gallagher, supra note 69; Endgame, 
ENDGAME (2013), https://www.endgame.com/. 
 
74 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7; Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15; Greenberg, supra 
note 12; Gallagher, supra note 69. 
 
75 Errata Security, ERRATA SECURITY (2013), http://www.erratasec.com/; Brewster, supra 
note 61. 
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Government 
Contractors76 U.S. based  
$100,000 and
up based on 
review of an 
anonymous 
product 
catalogue 
 Likely 
Individual Sellers 
The 
Grugq77 
Bangkok, 
native of South 
Africa 
Only sells to
American and 
European 
agencies for 
moral and 
profit reasons.
- 1 bug for 
$250,000 
- $1 million 
projected 
revenue for 2012
80% of revenue 
from the United 
States. 
Yes 
Charlie 
Miller78 U.S. based  $50,000  Currently inactive.  
Cesar 
Cerrudo
79  
Argentina/ 
Seattle, WA 
Selectively 
decided which 
requests to 
supply. 
 Currently inactive.  
 
 Estimating zero-day market volume with so little data is difficult. 
Figures for total U.S. government spending on zero-day vulnerabilities 
are not available. The NSA, presumably the largest purchaser of 
vulnerabilities, budgeted at least $25.1 million, as noted above.80  
Other agencies may spend more, less, or nothing. 
 Despite lack of data, rough estimates provide some insight; the 
following estimates represent original calculations. Yearly estimates of 
revenue or sales volume were available only for some sellers.  The 
Grugq projected $1 million in revenue for 2012, with 80 percent from 
the United States,81 which would indicate a maximum of $800,000 
 
 
 
 
76 Menn, supra note 14; Brewster, supra note 61. 
77 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7,Greenberg, supra note 12; Marcia Hoffman & Trevor 
Timm, Zero-Day Exploit Sales Should Be Key Point in Cybersecurity Debate, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/zero-
day-exploit-sales-should-be-key-point-cybersecurity-debate. 
 
78 Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 7; Miller, supra note 43. 
 
79 Menn, supra note 14; Robert Lemos, Bug Brokers Offering Higher Bounties, 
SECURITYFOCUS (Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11437/3. 
80 Gellman & Nakashima, supra note 6. 
81 Greenberg, supra note 12. 
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U.S. revenue. VUPEN reported $1.2 million revenue in 2011, with 86 
percent outside France.82 VUPEN’s maximum U.S. revenue would be 
about $1 million. Netragard reports yearly sales of 50 bugs83 from 
$16,00084 to $250,000.85  Netragard’s lowest possible maximum U.S. 
revenue from zero-days would be $800,000, assuming all bugs are 
sold in the United States for $16,000.  Assuming Netragard sells two 
zero-days yearly for its top price, its largest estimated maximum U.S. 
revenue would be $1.3 million.  Exodus Intelligence reported 
purchasing 12 bugs in its first 6 weeks.86 Assuming this trend 
continues, Exodus would purchase roughly 100 bugs annually.  Given 
no public price information for Exodus, assume Exodus purchases 
bugs at the lowest price listed by Forbes, $5,000, and sells them for 
$10,000 each.87 Exodus would earn $500,000. For a higher estimate, 
assume Exodus sells each bug for the lowest listed price in Table 1, 
$16,000, generating revenue of $1.1 million. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Maximum Yearly U.S. Revenue 
from Vulnerability Sales (2012-13) 
 
Seller Revenue
The Grugq $800,000
VUPEN $1,000,000
Netragard $800,000-$1,300,000
Exodus Intelligence $500,000-$1,100,000
 
                                                                                                                   
 
82 Gallagher, supra note 69. 
83 Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15. 
84 Gallagher, supra note 69. 
 
85 Digital Arms Trade, supra note 15. 
86 EIP August Incentives, supra note 72. 
 
87 Greenberg, supra note 12. 
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 If all active sellers described in Table 1 performed similarly, total 
U.S. revenues of the identified firms combined could be about $10 
million at the high end.  The Grugq, responding to these estimates, 
states that he sized the market at less than $5 million but calls my 
figures for the companies in Table 2 “probably about right.”88 
However, a considerable gap exists between known government 
purchasing figures, the revenues of known companies, and the market 
estimates completed by the Grugq and myself. This gap suggests 
several possibilities: 
 
 The U.S. government allocates more funds for purchases than 
it spends; 
 
 More companies exist than are publicly known, operating in 
relative secrecy; and 
 
 The figures above do not consider government contractor 
revenue; contractors may be highly active sellers. 
 
 The first possibility is unlikely, given market growth in the U.S. 
and overseas. However, the NSA budget could potentially be used for 
zero-day vulnerabilities and previously disclosed (one-day, etc.) 
vulnerabilities, which are generally cheaper and readily available. The 
second and third explanations probably exist in tandem. Given their 
existing relationships with the government, contractors probably play 
a large role in the gray market, and their prices are not reflected in my 
analysis. Given the relative opacity of the trade, more firms likely 
exist, operating in secrecy, exacerbating the transparency problems 
already evident. Overall, despite gaps in data, available information 
demonstrates the trade is global, lucrative, and opaque. 
 The zero-day trade lacks transparency on the government and 
private seller sides – no Freedom of Information Act option exists for 
companies – and the trade presents security and other policy 
concerns. Although the trade is lucrative, the zero-day issue is not the 
highest-grossing or single-most concerning problem in cybersecurity. 
However, the associated suite of security implications means the 
unregulated zero-day trade represents a troubling practice. Given 
these concerns, national and international strategies for controlling 
 
 
 
 
88 The Grugq, Only thing that was interesting was the table showing that the market is 
<$4m, TWITTER (June 24, 2014), https://twitter.com/thegrugq 
/status/481506494416826368. 
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the trade should be explored, drawing where possible on past 
approaches to regulating dual-use technologies. The next two parts of 
this article undertake this analysis. 
 
III. DOMESTIC STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING THE ZERO-DAY TRADE 
A. Introduction 
 Three strategies for domestic regulation of zero-day vulnerabilities 
deserve particular attention – criminalization, export controls, and 
increased oversight of U.S. government involvement in the zero-day 
trade. These case studies are useful for three reasons. First, these 
approaches are different in nature, ranging from stringent 
criminalization to flexible oversight, providing a diversity of 
approaches. Second, these strategies have been used in analogous 
contexts and with dual-use technologies, which permits those 
experiences to inform thinking about zero-day trade regulation. 
Finally, each strategy is being considered, to some degree, by 
policymakers as determined by a review of relevant literature, policy 
discussions in civil society, and interviews conducted with policy-
community members. 
B. Criminalization  
1. Criminal Law and Zero-Days 
 The United States and other countries use criminal law to deter 
and punish certain activities undertaken through cyber technologies, 
such as gaining unauthorized access to computers. Applied to zero-
days, governments could criminalize sale and/or purchase of zero-day 
vulnerabilities as a regulatory strategy. For example, in 2007, 
Germany criminalized the distribution of hacking tools, such as 
Trojan Horses or software that extracts data from a hacked 
computer.89 Germany adopted this law to implement Article 6 of the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. 90 The law’s adoption 
raised the question of whether it extended to zero-day vulnerabilities. 
 
 
 
 
89  § 203 BGB. 
90 Dennis Jlussi, Handle With Care, But Don’t Panic: Criminalisation of Hacker Tools in 
German Criminal Law and its Effect on IT Security Professionals, EUROPEAN EXPERT GRP. 
FOR IT SEC. (Nov. 2007), http://www.jlussi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/jlussi-202c-
short.pdf; Convention on Cybercrime: What Do you Want to Know About This Treaty?, 
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 The German cybersecurity community objected because the law 
might apply to their research with, among other things, zero-days. In 
one of few academic pieces in English on the subject, Dennis Jlussi, 
then a candidate for a master’s in law at Leibniz Universität 
Hannover, observed that the German adaptation of the Convention on 
Cybercrime did not incorporate the exception for security researchers 
the Convention includes.91 Although I have found no record of 
prosecutions based on this German law, at least two security 
researchers who disclosed or planned to disclose vulnerabilities were 
threatened with legal action grounded in it, demonstrating the 
possibility of this legal approach affecting security research, 
potentially including research involving zero-days.92 
 In the United States, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 
criminalizes certain activities on or by a computer. Congress enacted 
CFAA in 1986 in response to growing concern about cybercrime.93 As 
discussed below, the U.S. government has used the CFAA to prosecute 
a black market zero-day exploit dealer, and academic proposals 
advocate amending the statute to cover trade in zero-days 
specifically.94 Broadly, the CFAA criminalizes committing, conspiring, 
and attempting to commit seven types of cyber crime (Table 3). The 
CFAA has been criticized for its “breadth and severity.”95 The law has 
increasingly been used to prosecute offenses such as violating website 
                                                                                                                   
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (n.d.), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ 
Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?CL=ENG&NT=185. 
 
91 Jlussi, supra note 90; Convention on Cybercrime, art. 6. sec. 2. CETS No. 85 (Nov. 23, 
2001),  http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm. 
92 See Kelly Jackson Higgins, Another Research Hit with Threat of German Anti-Hacking 
Law, DARKREADING (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---
threats/another-researcher-hit-with-threat-of-german-anti-hacking-law-/d/d-
id/1135605?; Kelly Jackson Higgins, Researcher Overcomes Legal Setback over ‘Cloud 
Cracking Suite,’ DARKREADING (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.darkreading.com/risk/researcher-overcomes-legal-setback-over-cloud-
cracking-suite/d/d-id/1135443?. 
93 Office of Legal Education, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf, at 1. 
 
94 See Michele Golabek-Goldman, A New Strategy for Reducing the Threat of Dangerous 
Zero-Day Sales to Global Security and the Economy: A Policy Analysis Exercise, 
HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOV’T, Mar. 25, 2014; Paul Stockton & Michele Golabek-
Goldman, Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 101 (2013). 
 
95 Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology. 
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terms of service or employer computer policies, not classical 
hacking.96 
 
Table 3: CFAA Basics 
The CFAA criminalizes the following offenses completed or attempted 
through or on a “protected computer:” 
o Obtaining national security information, or other   
protected information. 
o Trespassing on a government computer. 
o Accessing a computer to defraud and obtain anything 
of value. 
o Intentionally damaging by knowingly transmitting a 
program or similar code. 
o Recklessly and negligently causing damage by 
intentional access. 
• Trafficking in passwords. 
           Extorting through computers.97   
 
2. The CFAA’s Current Applicability to Zero-Day Exploits, 
Vulnerabilities 
  
 The U.S. government has applied the CFAA to black-market sales 
of zero-day exploits.98 Another case attempted to apply the CFAA to 
disclosure of zero-day vulnerabilities, but was dismissed.99 As far as is 
publicly known, gray-market sellers of zero-day exploits and 
vulnerabilities have not been targets of CFAA-related investigations. 
One explanation for this difference is that the CFAA excludes 
 
 
 
 
96 Wu, supra note 95; U. S. v. David Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).  
97 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
98 I thank Jonathan Mayer for the suggestion to examine the Ulbricht case; U. S. v. Ross 
William Ulbricht (S.D.N.Y. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/ pressreleases/ 
February14/RossUlbrichtIndictmentPR/US%20v.%20Ross%20Ulbricht%20Indictment.pd
f; U. S. v. Liberty Reserve, (S.D.N.Y. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/ 
pressreleases/May13/LibertyReserveetalDocuments/Liberty%20Reserve,%20et%20al.%2
0Indictment%20-%20Redacted.pdf. 
99 MBTA v. Anderson, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 2008), https://www.eff.org 
/cases/mbta-v-anderson. 
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authorized activities of intelligence and law enforcement agencies.100 
The language only excuses the government party, not the seller. 
However, as Jonathan Mayer, noted CFAA expert, observes, “the 
government is not going to charge the people who help them.”101  This 
government agency carve-out is potentially why some gray-market 
sellers restrict sales of zero-day exploits and other offense-oriented 
tools to government clients. Thus, the CFAA, even in its current form, 
may incentivize selling certain hacking tools to the government, taking 
advantage of a “safe harbor” from potential CFAA prosecutions. 
3. Proposal to Amend the CFAA to Address Sale of Certain  
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 
 A proposal from Paul Stockton, former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (2009-
13), and Michele Golabek-Goldman, a 2014 Yale Law School graduate, 
advocated amending the CFAA to apply explicitly to aspects of the 
zero-day trade.102 The authors argue that Congress should amend the 
CFAA “to govern dangerous 0-day exploit transactions.”103 They use 
the term “exploits” but characterize exploits as merely information. As 
explained above, exploits are more than mere information; they are 
new code exploiting underlying flaws. Stockton and Golabek-Goldman 
use the term exploits to refer to vulnerabilities, and “weaponized 
exploits” to refer to what this document calls exploits.104 Their 
proposal has three key elements: they focus on restricting critical-
infrastructure (CI) zero-day vulnerabilities, introducing a due 
diligence requirement for sellers of such vulnerabilities, and the 
extraterritorial application of this due diligence requirement. 
 Stockton and Golabek-Goldman suggest amending the CFAA to 
place an “affirmative duty on the seller to conduct due diligence when 
selling 0-day exploits that can be deployed to gain unauthorized 
access to critical-infrastructure.”105 The authors dismiss concerns that 
 
 
 
 
100 18 U.S.C.§1030(f). 
101 Skype interview with Jonathan Mayer, Stanford University PhD Candidate (Mar. 18, 
2014). 
102 Stockton & Golabek-Goldman, supra note 94. 
103 Id. at 123. 
104 See id. at 102 (“A zero-day ... and their components”). 
 
105 Id. at 124. (emphasis added). 
428 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 11:2 
 
their proposal would “contribute to what [is] perceive[d] as the 
CFAA’s already ‘dangerously broad criminalization of online activity 
and abuse of prosecutorial discretion.’”106  The authors suggest their 
proposal avoids this flaw by being “narrowly circumscribed so that 
only sellers of the most dangerous exploits that target critical 
infrastructure would be required to perform due diligence.”107 
 Stockton and Golabek-Goldman turn to the CFAA because they 
find its extraterritorial reach useful in targeting the zero-day 
vulnerability trade outside the United States. They argue that “a large 
number of dangerous 0-day exploit sales originate abroad and are 
therefore beyond the reach of American export laws … the United 
States must therefore have the capacity to prosecute researchers 
located abroad who sell exploits to U.S. adversaries.”108 The authors 
advocate updating the CFAA to target foreign sellers serving foreign 
buyers, foreign sellers serving U.S. buyers, and U.S. sellers serving all 
buyers. 
 This proposal would expand the CFAA to zero-day vulnerability 
sales related to CI and enable extraterritorial prosecution of sellers 
who fail to conduct due diligence about customers. Stockton and 
Golabek-Goldman attempt to affect the international zero-day market 
without requiring international cooperation. The U.S. government has 
used the CFAA to prosecute cyber actors located outside the United 
States who affected U.S. interests,109 but identifying and prosecuting 
such actors is difficult.  
 Still, the CFAA is not the appropriate approach to the zero-day 
problem. Mayer acknowledges that hooking the zero-day trade issue 
to the CFAA is a convenient way to achieve extraterritoriality. 
However, Mayer questions the fit: “It’s not clear to me why this needs 
to be under CFAA except for drafting convenience.”110 Problems also 
exist with applying their proposal for due diligence extraterritoriality: 
it represents an expansion of the CFAA that would enable the United 
States to target foreign sellers doing business with foreign buyers, an 
 
 
 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 123.  
109 See, e.g., Russian Man Sentenced for Hacking Into Computers in United States, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (July 25, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-
releases/2003/ivanovSent.htm. 
 
110 Mayer, supra note 101. 
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expansion that would anger other states and create severe practical 
difficulties, such as the refusal of foreign governments to engage in 
law enforcement cooperation. 
 Stockton and Golabek-Goldman’s proposal also raises multiple 
definitional problems that undermine its value. They call for only “the 
most dangerous exploits that target critical infrastructure” to be 
included in an amended CFAA.111 Defining what threshold zero-days 
must cross to be considered most dangerous would prove difficult. 
Indeed, in a later proposal (discussed below), Golabek-Goldman 
rejects a CI approach because “software deployed by critical 
infrastructure sectors is used elsewhere,” making it “challenging to 
determine whether a buyer aimed to deploy the purchased zero-day to 
target critical infrastructure.”112 Last, although Stockton and Golabek-
Goldman present CI as a narrowing feature of their proposal, the U.S. 
government defines CI expansively; Presidential Policy Directive 21 
identified 16 CI sectors.113 These definitional issues demonstrate that 
this proposal is not sufficiently clear and could be interpreted broadly. 
If such a proposal were implemented without clarification, it could be 
considered too vague to be fair, raising Fifth Amendment due process 
concerns; aspects of the CFAA have already been challenged on these 
grounds.114  
 Further, Stockton and Golabek-Goldman suggest amending the 
CFAA to penalize sellers, not buyers or users. Sellers would be 
required to conduct due diligence to ensure clients have no intentions 
of harming U.S. CI. If sellers fail to do so, it would face criminal 
penalties. This type of liability is somewhat akin to negligent 
entrustment, which recognizes tort liability if someone gives another 
person a dangerous tool (e.g., lending a car to a drunk).115 In its 
current form, the CFAA could be used to prosecute someone for 
accomplice liability or conspiracy to commit a CFAA violation (see 
Ulbricht prosecution above). Seller-based liability would introduce a 
new kind of criminal liability to the CFAA, “a weird species of 
 
 
 
 
111 Stockton & Golabek-Goldman, supra note 94, at 124. 
112 Golabek-Goldman, supra note 94. 
 
113 Presidential Policy Directive – Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, WHITE 
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
 
114 Orrin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1562 (2010). 
 
115 Mayer, supra note 101. 
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secondary liability,” Mayer argues.116 “You would be an accomplice” to 
a CFAA violation “by merely failing to do due diligence. I’m not aware 
of anything else that follows that kind of model, as opposed to getting 
someone because they handed a dangerous product to someone else 
without adequately checking them.”117 Thus, contrary to the authors’ 
intent to amend the CFAA narrowly, their proposal would broaden the 
already broad CFAA in controversial ways. 
 In light of definitional uncertainty, the expansive nature of the 
amendment, controversy over a new type of liability, and the criminal 
nature of the penalties, both zero-day sellers and current CFAA 
opponents would likely resist including zero-day vulnerabilities sales 
in the CFAA. Given these problems, amending the CFAA as Stockton 
and Golabek-Goldman recommend is not a good strategy.  
 
4. Golabek-Goldman’s Proposal: Updating the CFAA without 
Extending Extraterritoriality 
 
 After publication of her article with Stockton, Golabek-Goldman 
released a second paper on regulation of the zero-day trade in which 
she still proposes updating the CFAA to “impose an affirmative duty 
on zero-day sellers to ‘know their customers’ or only sell to particular 
[approved] entities.”118 However, Golabek-Goldman does not limit the 
proposal to CI and argues Congress should specify that this addition 
to the CFAA “would not apply extraterritorially” to foreign sellers.119 
 Golabek-Goldman’s rejection of extraterritoriality requires 
explanation, given that her proposal with Stockton embraced 
extraterritoriality as critical to their recommendation. In her proposal, 
Golabek-Goldman takes the opposite approach, arguing that 
“extending the CFAA to researchers operating abroad who recklessly 
sold zero-days to foreign buyers would constitute a vast expansion of 
extraterritoriality ... [and] could generate backlash, undermining the 
United States’ other efforts to achieve much-needed international 
cooperation in this field.”120 Although Golabek-Goldman’s revised 
proposal does not apply to foreign sellers serving foreign buyers, 
 
 
 
 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Golabek-Goldman, supra note 94. 
 
119 Id. at 54. 
120 Id.  
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whether Golabek-Goldman still intends this amendment to apply to 
foreign persons selling to U.S. buyers (a different form of 
extraterritorial application) is not clear. Subjecting U.S. sellers, but 
not foreign sellers serving U.S. clients, to criminal liability for 
engaging in the same activity would undermine the usefulness of a 
criminal law approach to the trade and create a major loophole. 
 With at least one type of extraterritoriality rejected, Golabek-
Goldman focuses on amending the CFAA to impose an affirmative 
duty on U.S. sellers to conduct due diligence about customers or sell 
only to pre-approved customers. This proposal means, as discussed 
above, U.S. sellers would face criminal liability if they violated due 
diligence requirements.  The risks involved with criminal liability, as 
Golabek-Goldman argues, could drive U.S.-based zero-day sellers to 
“safe harbor” options, including white-market and gray-market buyers 
such as the U.S. government or government contractors. 
 Although her more recent paper addresses shortcomings of her co-
authored article, Golabek-Goldman’s proposal still raises questions. 
First, it still advocates adding a “weird species of secondary liability”121 
and does not address problems associated with this idea discussed 
above. Second, it is not clear whether she rejects all problematic forms 
of extraterritorial application, or just the foreign seller to foreign 
buyer case. Other forms of extraterritorial application pose similar 
problems. Last, that Golabek-Goldman altered critical components of 
her co-authored article – the CI and extraterritorial elements – quite 
soon after its publication underscores the complexities, difficulties, 
and controversies that would accompany using a criminalization 
strategy to regulate the zero-day trade.  
 
5. Summary of the Criminalization Strategy 
National criminalization as a strategy to control the zero-day trade 
faces numerous problems. First, as demonstrated with Germany’s 
anti-hacking law and the dismissed CFAA case, application of criminal 
statutes to the discovery and disclosure of zero-day vulnerabilities 
generates serious concerns for security researchers, including 
potential free speech issues.122 Microsoft’s Scott Charney emphasizes 
this issue: “A lot of security involves research.  Disclosures are First 
Amendment protected here, and elsewhere, even if they [other 
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countries] don’t have the equivalent of the First Amendment, there is 
a strong commitment to protecting them. It is not healthy to solve the 
problem by criminalizing the finding or reporting of 
vulnerabilities.”123 
 Second, the CFAA is already contested given how the U.S. 
government has interpreted and applied it. 124  Using the CFAA as the 
basis for dealing with the zero-day trade might trigger increased 
opposition to the CFAA, diluting the potential for the CFAA to become 
a foundation for dealing with the zero-day trade. 
 Third, the existing proposals to amend the CFAA to deal with zero-
days demonstrate the problems a criminalization strategy faces. 
Cornerstone elements of Stockton and Golabek-Goldman’s proposal – 
the CI focus and application of the amendment extraterritoriality – 
are abandoned by Golabek-Goldman in the proposal she 
independently made soon after her co-authored article appeared. The 
elements constant across proposals – imposing criminal liability on 
sellers for failure to conduct due diligence on buyers – could create 
incentives for sellers to turn to white-market buyers or a limited set of 
gray-market purchasers, such as the U.S. government. However, the 
core approach generates so many problems, including threatening 
security research, the unusual nature of the proposed liability, 
potential due process problems from defining this liability, and 
opposition to such liability make criminalization an inappropriate 
approach.  
C. U.S.-Based Export Controls as a Regulatory Strategy for the Zero-
Day Trade 
1. Introduction to Export Controls 
 Export controls have been used to restrict export of software 
products and information, including those relating to cryptography. 
Using U.S. cryptography export controls as a case study, this section 
analyzes such controls as a possible model for regulating the zero-day 
trade. 
 The 1970s-1990s application of U.S. export controls to 
cryptography generated controversy, spawning the so-called “crypto-
wars.” The U.S. government viewed emergence of commercial 
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cryptography as a threat to its intelligence capabilities and foreign 
policy interests.125  The government sought to limit availability of U.S.-
originating cryptographic information and products abroad.126  
Opponents argued that export controls harmed U.S. competitiveness, 
infringed First Amendment rights, and created domestic insecurities 
because export controls reduced availability of highly secure 
encryption products domestically. 
 The “crypto wars” share similarities with the challenge of 
regulating trade in zero-day vulnerabilities. Both cases exhibit a U.S. 
government interested in preventing the spread of a strategic dual-use 
technology abroad. Additionally, U.S. policy in both cases is perceived 
to generate domestic insecurities. Government purchasing of zero-
days pulls business away from the white market, leaving 
vulnerabilities undisclosed and computer users at risk. With 
cryptography, export controls weakened available domestic 
cryptography, because many companies did not make distinct 
domestic and foreign products for cost reasons.127 Finally, both 
situations involve regulation of technology that is less physical than 
abstract.  Cryptography and zero-day vulnerabilities are, at their core, 
knowledge enabling technical developments. This feature introduces 
First Amendment concerns into debates about controlling 
cryptography and zero-day vulnerabilities. 
 However, cryptography export controls also differ from the zero-
day vulnerability challenge. With cryptography, the government 
played a strong development role, and the United States was the clear 
technological leader.  With zero-days, the government has been less 
involved and the trade is already global. These differences will affect 
how well export controls can apply to zero-days. 
 U.S. export controls on cryptography were introduced through the 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which took its current name and 
form in 1976 and is administered by the State Department, and the 
1979 Export Administration Act (EAA). Initially, nearly all encryption 
tools were classified under AECA as defense articles or services 
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subject to export controls.128 AECA provides strong enforcement and 
criminal and civil penalties and is not subject to judicial review.129 If 
an item falls under AECA, the item will typically require an 
individually approved export license, with a designated customer, 
application, and conditions for use and resale.130  
 Under the less strict EAA, a seller can obtain a license exporting to 
a category of customers rather than one specific buyer.131 Penalties for 
violation of these Department of Commerce (DoC) administered 
regulations are generally less severe than AECA penalties.132 The DoC 
must also sometimes consider foreign availability of controlled 
products when setting export restrictions.133 
 
2. Opposition and Changes to Cryptography Export Controls  
 Cryptography export controls encountered opposition from the 
computer industry, which argued that restrictions hindered 
competitiveness by allowing foreign firms to sell to customers U.S. 
firms could not.134 Companies argued that controls slowed 
technological development and harmed domestic security, because 
firms resisted developing separate U.S. versions, producing only a less 
robust, exportable version.135 
 Export controls also encountered First Amendment opposition.  
Three major court cases dealt with this issue, and each decision 
hinged on whether the court held encryption code was functional or 
expressive.  The government argued that encryption was functional 
and required control, while plaintiffs argued that encryption transmits 
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ideas.136 One court case decided export controls represented 
unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.137 A second decision held 
that export controls on certain functional information were 
allowable.138  A third case held the First Amendment applies to 
encryption source code.139 Taken together, this inconsistent case law 
contributed to the controversy and confusion surrounding encryption 
export controls. 
 Industry resistance, judicial rulings, and a changing international 
political climate resulted in cryptography export control liberalization. 
Changes in the early 1990s transferred authority over most encryption 
to the less strict DoC lists.140 The Clinton administration also retreated 
from only allowing export of encryption having a U.S. government-
accessible key-recovery system.141 The military began to realize that 
export controls hampered finding cheap, commercial products 
meeting military security needs.  Because companies often developed 
only an exportable product, the military had to commission more 
secure products for its use at high cost.142 Congressional opposition 
was also strong, culminating in a 1999 Security and Freedom through 
Encryption (SAFE) Act, which would have mandated changes to 
encryption export controls.143 The bill was on its way to a House vote 
when the Clinton administration capitulated.144 The administration 
announced encryption of any key length could be exported after 
technical review to most end users, except users in designated state 
sponsors of terrorism.145 A post-export reporting requirement would 
be in effect for keys over 64 bits.146  
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 The ECHELON scandal also influenced liberalization.147  It 
revealed U.S. intelligence targeted major commercial communication 
channels, including satellites.148  To bolster defenses against U.S. 
intelligence, the EU ended encryption export controls within the EU 
and for close trading partners.149  Given Europe’s lowered barriers, the 
Clinton administration removed the requirement for export licenses 
for cryptographic products destined for EU members and additional 
destinations.150 
 September 11 somewhat slowed liberalization.  With new emphasis 
on homeland security, the DoC export control group was rechristened 
the more cautious Bureau of Industry and Security.151 Still, one more 
significant round of liberalization occurred in 2002. Mass-market 
encryption products greater than 64 bits could be exported after a 30-
day review, the lightest barrier yet.152 
 
3. The Fall of Cryptography Export Controls: Lessons 
 When encryption export controls were first instated in the 1970s, 
the United States had the “economic power to make export control an 
effective element of foreign policy.”153  As the dominant source for 
particular products, U.S. export controls could affect global product 
availability. With globalization, “many more products [are] available 
from non-U.S. sources,” meaning U.S. export controls are less 
effective.154 The availability of products means that “the cost to U.S. 
businesses of export controls” is greater.155 This situation is 
particularly true for computer companies, which derive considerable 
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revenue from foreign sales and must manufacture exportable products 
to be competitive.156   
 The post-Cold War environment contributed to the U.S. 
government’s diminished political power to encourage countries to 
implement equivalent national export controls.  In this environment, 
“other countries, even close allies, do not always share the U.S. view 
that a particular country is a strategic threat.”157 Other countries may 
welcome U.S. export controls as an economic opportunity and move to 
supply that market.  In the post-Cold War era, it also became less clear 
what specific global threat dual-use technologies posed.  If no rival 
superpower was waiting to snatch up encryption, why keep such 
technologies closely held? A country whose access becomes restricted 
may view such a policy as overly punitive. Technologically, the rise of 
the Internet and other forms of digital communication increased 
demand for cryptographic products and made export controls 
focusing on physical goods less effective.158   
 Additionally, during the 1990s, the U.S. military sought to 
maximize its budget by purchasing commercial rather than custom 
products. Since cryptography export controls restricted the supply of 
domestically available, rigorous encryption products, the military had 
to fund development of expensive custom products, which brought 
them to support loosened export controls.159  
 First Amendment challenges to cryptography export controls 
played a crucial role in their demise. A growing and vocal community 
of activists supported these challenges. This community catalyzed by 
the crypto wars would later go on to fight the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA), the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), and NSA surveillance programs.  
 
4. Analysis of Export Controls and Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 
 Export controls are a supply-side solution. Foreign buyers deal 
with secondary effects of export controls, such as resale restrictions, 
but the primary burden falls on sellers. As such, export controls would 
not address concerns about U.S. government purchasing and use of 
zero-days.  Instead, like criminalization, export controls would 
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address U.S. concerns about U.S.-based sellers supplying foreign 
buyers. 
 Export controls limit potential foreign buyers of U.S. products, 
furthering the U.S. goal of preventing certain countries or groups from 
accessing zero-day vulnerabilities. Export controls may reduce the 
volume of foreign trade. Instead of dealing with export regulations, 
sellers may turn to U.S.-based purchasers, including the U.S. 
government.  This impact would likely positively affect security by 
keeping more trade within U.S. and, perhaps, slowing the global 
market.  However, many obstacles exist to achieving these benefits. 
 Trade in zero-day vulnerabilities is global. Geopolitical and 
economic realities mean U.S.-based export controls would not wield 
the force cryptography export controls did when first instated.  Major 
non-U.S. vendors of zero-day vulnerabilities exist (see Table 1), so 
restricting export of U.S.-based vulnerabilities would not materially 
reduce the suite of vulnerabilities buyers could access. Microsoft’s 
Scott Charney highlights this problem, observing “export controls do 
not work in a globally connected Internet and it is not only one 
country that can find bugs.”160 Given this global availability, U.S. 
companies may resist export controls as damaging their global 
competitiveness. 
 If the United States enacted unilateral export controls, it could 
seek to pressure allies to institute parallel national controls, as with 
encryption controls.161  The resistance U.S. leadership encountered to 
spreading key escrow policies abroad, and to unilateral U.S. 
leadership after the Snowden disclosures, could suggest that it would 
be difficult for the United States to convince countries enjoying 
economic advantages from the trade to join a U.S.-led effort to restrict 
it. To overcome doubts about U.S. leadership and achieve 
international buy-in, a coordinated export controls approach, such as 
through the Wassenaar Arrangement, would have to be sought, as 
discussed below.  
 Encryption export controls raised the question whether source 
code constituted protected speech and whether digital and analogue 
information should be treated differently. Today’s zero-day trade 
takes place in a digital realm facilitated by the Internet. The 
“functional v. expressive” distinctions courts made between books, 
physical diskettes, and source code during the crypto wars are not as 
helpful with zero-days. The zero-day vulnerability trade is based on 
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selling knowledge of flaws in code, not code itself.  Such knowledge-
based vulnerabilities are not “functional,” because they do not involve 
new code. Under this perspective, export controls on zero-day 
vulnerabilities may constitute prior restraints on speech in violation of 
the First Amendment. However, transmission of knowledge about a 
zero-day may not be fully expressive speech, either, because it 
transfers information about someone else’s code rather than being an 
expressive act, such as writing code. In sum, First Amendment issues 
would complicate export controls on zero-day vulnerabilities, but it is 
not clear which way courts would rule. 
 Zero-day exploits, new code written to utilize a zero-day 
vulnerability, could more easily be included under export-control 
mechanisms, because exploits are more readily definable as 
functional. However, as newly created code, exploits are also 
potentially expressive. The existence of zero-day vulnerabilities and 
exploits in the same market, often sold by the same companies, 
complicates attempts to navigate First Amendment considerations 
when regulating this trade.  
 
D. Oversight Mechanisms  
 The third domestic regulatory strategy involves implementing 
more robust oversight of zero-day vulnerability purchasing and use 
within the U.S. government.  From what is publicly known, much of 
U.S. government zero-day purchasing and use occurs within the 
intelligence community, which has a history of both being subject to 
and frustrating various oversight mechanisms.  Additionally, high-
profile applications of zero-days, including in Stuxnet, have been 
considered covert operations,162 suggesting oversight of such 
operations may be a useful source of ideas. This section analyzes how 
existing oversight systems for intelligence and covert activities might 
inform oversight for the zero-day trade. 
1. Overview of Intelligence and Covert Operations Oversight 
a. Legislative Oversight 
 Congress is a significant source of oversight of intelligence 
activities and covert operations.  The 1947 National Security Act 
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authorizes the CIA to perform functions at the President’s direction, 
which has been interpreted to include covert actions – actions 
intended to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, but where a U.S. role will not be apparent.163   
 Congress strengthened oversight for covert actions by requiring 
the President to make a written finding on the national security 
importance of a covert action and providing information on all covert 
actions to the appropriate intelligence committees.164 Congress also 
prohibited use of appropriated funds for covert actions unless there is 
a written Presidential finding, and appropriated funds may only be 
used for intelligence activities reported to the committees.165 
Additionally, Congress also required regular reporting of all 
intelligence actions to the intelligence committees.166 It has taken 
recent steps to strengthen internal checks and balances in the 
intelligence community, including establishing the Office of the 
Intelligence Community Inspector General (IG) in the Office of 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2010.167 
 In light of the Snowden disclosures, many questioned whether 
congressional oversight of intelligence community (IC) activities is 
effective. The House attempted to prohibit the NSA’s phone records 
collection program in July 2013, but the bill was narrowly defeated. 168 
The House approved a similar bill in 2014, but the Senate failed to 
secure enough votes to bring its version to a floor debate, leaving the 
path to legislative NSA reform highly unlikely. 169 Many proposals have 
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been made to address this sense of failure of congressional oversight 
of intelligence. For instance, Fred Cate, a privacy and cybersecurity 
expert, suggests creating an independent agency separate from both 
Congress and the executive branch to provide stronger oversight. 170 
 
b. Executive Branch Oversight 
 Oversight initiated and executed by the executive branch plays a 
significant role in monitoring intelligence activities and covert action 
programs.  Executive Order 12333, initially signed by President 
Reagan, gives the Attorney General authority to approve techniques 
for foreign intelligence gathering.171  It also authorizes the CIA to 
conduct covert activities approved by the President.172  
 In 2013, the Obama administration’s 2012 Presidential Policy 
Directive 20 (PPD-20) was leaked. The document established 
classified policy for U.S. cyber operations. PPD-20 contained “broad 
and strict” restrictions for cyber operations, including establishing 
distinctions between defensive and offensive procedures and requiring 
Presidential consent for certain operations.173 
 An additional component of the system of executive branch 
oversight is the role of Inspector General in various departments. For 
instance, in 2010 Congress established the Office of the Intelligence 
Community Inspector General (IG) in the Office of Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI).174 The ODNI IG is tasked with 
conducting audits and investigations into intelligence community 
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activities. Similar Inspector General positions perform the same 
function in parallel agencies across the government. 
 
c. Judicial Review as Oversight 
 Generally, federal courts provide venues for challenges to the legality 
of U.S. government actions. In the intelligence context, the 1978 Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) instituted a legal regime for 
governing foreign intelligence conducted within the United States, 
including roles for the judiciary.  FISA established the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to oversee U.S. government 
surveillance to collect foreign intelligence information in the United 
States.175 Specifically, the court has jurisdiction to grant approvals for 
electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen register/tap and trace 
surveillance, and orders compelling the production of tangible things.176 
 Broadly, FISA allows surveillance against a person within the United 
States to be approved based on probable cause that the target is a foreign 
power or agent of a foreign power.177 The FISC is composed of seven 
federal district court judges appointed by the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice, and it hears arguments only from the Department of Justice.178 
FISA also plays a role in foreign intelligence operations targeting non-
U.S. persons outside the United States, such as the PRISM program 
disclosed by Snowden, in which the NSA gained broad access to Internet 
communications stored or transmitted within the United States of non-
U.S. persons believed to be located abroad.179  
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2. U.S. Government Zero-Day Policy and Practice 
a. Pre-2014 
 As the introduction noted, the U.S. government released details in 
2014 about its policy regarding use and disclosure of zero-day 
vulnerabilities.  Before analyzing these changes, what is known about 
pre-2014 activities deserves examination.  The NSA, and likely other 
agencies, purchased zero-day vulnerabilities. As discussed, the NSA 
allocated $25.1 million to purchasing vulnerabilities during fiscal year 
2013, correlating with about 100 to 625 vulnerabilities minimum per 
year.180 Reports indicated that zero-days were used in Stuxnet.181 
Additionally, the NSA is thought to stockpile and use zero-day 
vulnerabilities to aid in inserting tracking and other implants on 
targeted computers.182  
 These NSA activities were widely criticized. Concerning zero-days, 
the government seemed to maintain the following policy: when it 
discovered or purchased a vulnerability, the default was not to 
disclose the vulnerability to affected companies, instead stockpiling it 
for later use, leaving citizen and industry users vulnerable.183 The NSA 
may have had internal policies governing disclosure versus 
stockpiling, but there is little public indication that such policies 
existed. Richard Clarke, who advised President Bush on cybersecurity, 
commented, “[t]here is supposed to be some mechanism for deciding 
how they use the [vulnerability] information, for offense or defense. 
But there isn’t.”184 The government seemed, by default, to prioritize 
national security and intelligence needs over broader cybersecurity.  
 In addition, the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
included language requesting the establishment of “an interagency 
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process to provide for the establishment of an integrated policy to 
control the proliferation of cyber weapons through unilateral and 
cooperative law enforcement activities, financial means, diplomatic 
engagement, and such other means as the President considers 
appropriate.”185 The NDAA indicated Congress’ and the military’s 
awareness of the international security problems created by, among 
other things, trade in zero-days.  
 
b. The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies 
  
 Zero-day vulnerabilities were not at the forefront of Snowden’s 
revelations, but the presidential panel tasked with proposing reforms 
in light of these revelations recommended increased oversight of zero-
day vulnerability use.  The panel recommended an interagency 
process managed by the National Security Council to review zero-day 
vulnerability use.186 The panel suggested instituting a default policy of 
disclosing or patching zero-day vulnerabilities, rather than 
stockpiling.187 This suggestion is a strong indication that the existing 
default had been to stockpile rather than disclose. In “rare instances, 
U.S. policy may briefly authorize using a Zero Day for high priority 
intelligence collection, following senior, interagency review involving 
all appropriate departments.”188  
 Peter Swire, a Review Group member, illuminates the thinking 
behind the zero-day recommendation.  Despite being largely absent 
from Snowden’s revelations, focusing on zero-day policy represented 
an opportunity to stress the attitude the Review Group wanted to 
encourage in the U.S. government.  Swire says, “We didn’t decide at 
the start to go after zero-days. The institutional big picture suggested a 
worry that offense is greater than defense and one way to address this 
concern is to address zero-days ... Given our commitment to these 
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broader themes, our recommendation on zero-days was a logical 
component of our report.”189   
 Swire is right to ground zero-days in broader problems; zero-days 
do not exist in isolation from other cyber considerations. Still, the 
Review Group’s recommendations represent a shift towards greater 
oversight of zero-days, adding a specific zero-day component to 
discussions about post-Snowden oversight regimes. The 
recommendations, however, did not address government purchase of 
vulnerabilities, a problematic and inseparable aspect of the zero-day 
problem.  
 
c. NSA Director Confirmation Hearing Remarks 
 
 In March 2014, Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers addressed U.S. 
policy towards zero-day disclosure in his confirmation hearings for 
becoming Director of the NSA and Commander of U.S. Cyber 
Command. Rogers indicated that the “NSA is now working with the 
White House to put into place an interagency process for adjudication 
of 0-day vulnerabilities.”190 Rogers’ language echoes the Review 
Group’s, raising the possibility that the Group’s zero-day 
recommendation was being implemented. Rogers also indicated that 
the NSA has an existing “equity resolution process” for determining 
what to do with discovered zero-days. The process’ “default is to 
disclose vulnerabilities in products and systems used by the U.S. and 
its allies.”191 
 Rogers’ testimony was the first public description of NSA zero-day 
policy.  Although his suggestion that the NSA has a “default to 
disclose” is initially appealing, what characteristics of vulnerabilities 
trigger a decision not to disclose a zero-day?  What are the 
consequences of the requirement that the vulnerability should be 
present in “products and systems used by the U.S. and its allies” to 
merit disclosure? With only Rogers’ testimony to examine, these 
questions remain unanswered. 
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d. After Heartbleed, Senior Officials Detail Policy 
 After the discovery of Heartbleed and the subsequent controversy 
about potential government knowledge of the vulnerability, senior 
Obama administration officials provided more details on the 
administration’s policy towards vulnerability disclosure. Caitlin 
Hayden, a National Security Council spokesperson, indicated that the 
zero-day review process is “biased toward responsibly disclosing such 
vulnerabilities.”192 Again, this statement contains ambiguities – what 
percentage of vulnerabilities does this “bias” indicate? In what 
circumstances does the government decide not to disclose? 
 The officials further indicated that President Obama decided that, 
“when the National Security Agency discovers major flaws in Internet 
security” the NSA “should – in most circumstances – reveal them ... 
rather than keep them mum so that the flaws can be used.”193 The 
officials noted President Obama created “a broad exception for ‘a clear 
national security or law enforcement need,’” a loophole which Sanger 
indicates will “likely allow the NSA to continue to exploit security 
flaws both to crack encryption on the Internet and to design 
cyberweapons.” 194 
 Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law professor and former Bush 
administration official, raised questions about these statements.  He 
argues that the statements imply two exceptions: “not every software 
vulnerability constitutes a ‘major flaw in Internet security’ and thus 
those vulnerabilities that do not rise to that level need not be 
disclosed” and “the phrase ‘in most circumstances’ implies that 
sometimes the NSA will not reveal even a major flaw in Internet 
security.”195  Are vulnerabilities in Microsoft programs, such as those 
used in Stuxnet, not covered by this new policy? Goldsmith also points 
out that the phrase “in most circumstances” could encompass broad 
exceptions.196 For instance, although it denied prior knowledge of 
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Heartbleed, the administration did not deny the possibility that it 
would have withheld rather than disclosed the vulnerability had it 
known about it.  
 Goldsmith wonders if this announcement represents any change 
from prior practice, and whether the exceptions will have any practical 
impact on the NSA’s practices.  Goldsmith argues that, “these 
exceptions, taken together, appear to be quite a lot broader than 
Recommendation 30 [of the Review Group], which (among other 
things) presumes that all zero-day vulnerabilities will be disclosed 
(and not only those that constitute a major flaw in Internet security), 
and allows exceptions only for an urgent national security priority.”197 
 Peter Swire discounts these criticisms.  He perceives that 
Recommendation 30 was generally adopted. When I asked him how 
he would respond to critics who suggest the national security 
exceptions in the announced policy are too broad, he responded, “It’s 
the job of the ACLU to say that.”198 Swire elaborates, “If you have a 
zero-day to get into the Iranian facilities and you eliminate it, that is a 
very consequential decision. Any president would think long and hard 
before giving up on national security targets like that.”199 
 Goldsmith’s questions do not reject Swire’s assessment of the need 
for high-priority exceptions, and Goldsmith is not from the ACLU. 
Still, Swire’s perception that the announcement represents change is 
supported by circumstantial facts.  Zero-days were not a prominent 
feature of Snowden’s documents, so less public pressure existed to 
change zero-day policy. President Obama made earlier policy 
announcements regarding changes to NSA policy and did not mention 
vulnerability disclosure.  These circumstances could suggest the 
recent policy statements are more than window dressing. 
 Perhaps the most concerning omission in the policy 
announcement is lack of language addressing purchased 
vulnerabilities.  The language highlights “when the National Security 
agency discovers” a vulnerability, the bias should be towards 
disclosure.200 Does the disclosure bias extend to purchased 
vulnerabilities? If not, this represents a significant loophole.  
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 Regulating purchase of zero-days, however, is complex. When 
asked about this potential loophole, Microsoft’s Scott Charney 
reflected that, given appropriate oversight, encouraging government 
purchasing of vulnerabilities could be beneficial, in order to get 
vulnerabilities off the market and (mostly) patched.201 Alternatively, 
purchased and non-disclosed vulnerabilities could be more valuable, 
dangerous, or discoverable by third parties, making a lack of oversight 
even more dangerous to ordinary computer users.202 If current 
disclosure policy only extends to vulnerabilities discovered in-house 
by government agencies, the U.S. government’s participation in the 
gray market remains without evident oversight. 
 After the New York Times article, the White House released a blog 
post, authored by Michael Daniel, Special Assistant to the President 
and Cybersecurity Coordinator.203 Daniel asserts the Obama 
administration “re-invigorated our efforts to implement existing 
policy with respect to disclosing vulnerabilities.”204  Is Daniel 
suggesting that, previously, policy was not implemented with 
sufficient vigor?  Despite cryptic language, Daniel identified questions 
the administration employs when deciding to disclose or stockpile a 
vulnerability:  
 
• “How much is the vulnerable system used in the core Internet 
infrastructure, in other critical infrastructure systems, in the 
U.S. economy, and/or in national security systems? 
 
• Does the vulnerability, if left unpatched, impose significant 
risk? 
 
• How much harm could an adversary nation or criminal group 
do with knowledge of this vulnerability? 
 
• How likely is it that we would know if someone else was 
exploiting it? 
 
• How badly do we need the intelligence we think we can get 
from exploiting the vulnerability? 
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• Are there other ways we can get it? 
 
• Could we utilize the vulnerability for a short period of time 
before we disclose it? 
 
• How likely is it that someone else will discover the 
vulnerability? 
 
• Can the vulnerability be patched or otherwise mitigated?”205 
 
 Goldsmith reads the list to suggest that the administration takes 
advantage of vulnerabilities “in a wider array of circumstances than 
(as the Review Group said) in ‘rare instances’ and only for ‘high 
priority intelligence collection.’”206  Microsoft’s Scott Charney 
characterizes these questions as a policy of “We’ll share unless we 
don’t.”207  
 Goldsmith notes, however, that these questions reveal the 
disclosure equities process is more complex than the Review Group 
acknowledged.  Still, Goldsmith argues that Daniel’s post is 
noteworthy for several reasons, including that it “makes clear that the 
USG takes defense of the Internet, and disclosure of vulnerabilities, 
very seriously, and that it has gone to greater lengths than any other 
nation to make public its policy guidelines.”208  
 
3. Analysis of Oversight Mechanisms and U.S. Government Zero-Day 
Vulnerability Purchase and Use 
 
 Existing oversight specific to zero-days stems primarily from the 
executive branch. Congress did include calls for the creation of an 
interagency process that would go on to establish policies to control 
“proliferation of cyber weapons,” but it is unclear what progress on 
such a group has been made, and whether controlling “proliferation” 
includes addressing the government’s own practices.  
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 The Obama administration has set standards to encourage greater 
vulnerability disclosure, and could continue to augment that policy. 
An executive order or presidential policy directive could establish 
common definitions and policies across agencies, with flexibility to 
change as needed.209 An executive order could, for instance, require 
the approval of the president or an executive branch department head 
(e.g., Secretary of Defense) for purchase, use, or disclosure of 
vulnerabilities.  It could also mandate interagency cooperation to 
facilitate greater price and other transparency between competing 
government purchasers, an idea addressed more below. Scott Charney 
of Microsoft suggests additional possibilities: “you can do things like 
an Inspector General’s report [i.e. to relevant Congressional 
committees], an outside review, and independent audit by cleared 
people.”210 In sum, executive oversight is a relatively low-barrier path 
to increased oversight and is more easily adapted to changing 
circumstances than legislative or judicial oversight. Executive 
oversight may lack high levels of public transparency, but a 
congressional or judicial approach would also be considerably 
shrouded from public view given intelligence and military needs for 
secrecy. 
 The judicial review mechanisms established by FISA deal with 
authorization of foreign intelligence activities.  As such, they are tool-
neutral: foreign intelligence surveillance enabled by a zero-day 
vulnerability or telephone wiretapping would be evaluated under the 
same legal standards.  Given this reality, there is not an obvious role 
for judicial oversight of use of zero-day vulnerabilities. The nature of 
FISC’s review of foreign intelligence means it would have no role 
evaluating the purchase of zero-days. Federal court oversight of the 
purchase, use, or disclosure of zero-days is not in keeping with the 
judiciary’s legislated role in monitoring foreign intelligence within the 
United States. Attempts to increase the judiciary’s oversight role 
concerning zero-days would likely be opposed by the IC as heavy-
handed and unnecessary. The IC would likely, and perhaps rightly, 
question whether an operation using a purchased zero-day 
vulnerability deserves greater judicial scrutiny than other intelligence 
operations. 
 Congress could impose limits on purchase, use, and disclosure of 
zero-days. As it has done with intelligence activities and covert 
actions, it could require reporting from agencies and/or Inspector 
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Generals to relevant congressional committees when a zero-day is 
purchased, used, disclosed, and/or not disclosed. Such requirements 
could be accompanied by the threat of withheld appropriations if the 
executive branch fails to follow oversight rules. However, 
congressional oversight is likely politically difficult to achieve. 
Snowden has made cyber topics politically fraught, and Congress is 
perceived as dysfunctional. Congressional oversight has also 
traditionally applied to broad programs, such as foreign intelligence 
activities within the United States or covert operations overseas, not a 
specific means of accomplishing law enforcement, intelligence, or 
military objectives.  
 
4. Select Possibilities for Expanded Executive Branch Oversight of 
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 
 
 This section presents several specific possibilities for greater 
oversight I developed through conversations with experts. While not 
fully formed, they demonstrate the range and flexibility such 
mechanisms could possess, and address perceived holes in current 
policy.  Particularly, these possibilities conceive of oversight that could 
address both use and purchase of zero-day vulnerabilities, whereas 
current oversight appears to focus on use and disclosure. 
 Based on existing executive branch oversight of zero-days and its 
advantages for implementation and alteration, oversight by the 
executive branch appears to have the most promise as a zero-day 
oversight mechanism. The first potential way to expand executive 
branch oversight would be to encourage increased transparency about 
government practices. Transparency is a typical first-stage oversight 
approach and could take a variety of forms. Currently, U.S. 
government agencies seem to make zero-day purchases separately, 
without coordination, potentially bidding prices up.211 To address this 
issue, one mechanism might be to have government agencies 
participate in a registry, where prices for purchases are shared.212 
Economists have demonstrated that price transparency generally 
leads to lower prices, although effects vary between products.213 Using 
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transparency to achieve lower prices, although benefitting 
government purchasers, would also serve to equalize white-market 
and gray-market cost incentives. To address bidding wars driving 
prices high or low, Mayer suggested instituting “a priority list, so if 
DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] and NSA bid on a vulnerability, NSA 
could get it.”214 
 This shared-list mechanism would constitute buyer coordination, 
which can lower prices.215 Intelligence agencies have resisted public 
disclosure of prices for zero-day vulnerabilities,216 but buyer 
coordination could represent a middle path, hopefully resulting in 
lower prices for agencies while not requiring public sharing of prices.  
 Transparency mechanisms can be criticized as weak measures. 
Mayer suggests several ways to help ensure transparency mechanisms 
are more than gestures.  As one example, he envisioned a policy that 
would threaten banning purchase of zero-days after a certain period, 
unless players respond well to the transparency mechanisms.217  
However, Mayer concedes, little political appetite for pressure on 
industry currently exists.218 
 Beyond transparency, executive branch oversight could strengthen 
the equities process for disclosure of vulnerabilities, extending what 
was recently announced.  Particularly, instituting a post-use or post-
stockpiling review could ensure reevaluation of vulnerabilities 
previously exempted from disclosure.  This review could ensure that 
the original national security need for exempting the vulnerability 
from disclosure continues to validate keeping the vulnerability secret. 
Charney reflected on the prospect of such a review process, and 
commented that, indeed, after Stuxnet, it might be interesting to see 
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whether the government adequately balanced competing equities.219 
Moreover, if purchased vulnerabilities are not currently subject to the 
same initial review as vulnerabilities discovered in-house, post-use or 
post-stockpiling review would extend the equities process to this 
important category of vulnerabilities.  
 
e. Summary of Domestic Regulation Strategies 
 This part analyzed three domestic strategies for regulating the 
zero-day trade – criminalization, national export controls, and 
increased oversight. Criminalization might motivate sellers to 
participate in the white market or sell only to certain gray-market 
buyers, such as the U.S. government. The CFAA carve-out for 
government agency activities may already somewhat encourage this 
outcome. However, criminalization has downsides, including debates 
about what form of liability it would take, due process concerns about 
definitional precision, the potential to chill security research, its 
limited impact on the global scale of the trade, and its inapplicability 
to U.S. government behavior.  
 Export controls could reduce the range of customers who can 
access vulnerabilities sold by U.S. companies. Additionally, the 
burden of dealing with export regulations might incentivize sellers to 
turn to U.S.-based customers, including the U.S. government.220 Still, 
export controls face geopolitical, economic, technical, and First 
Amendment obstacles. 
 Policies governing U.S. government purchase and use of zero-
days, and details of the gray market, need clarification for effective 
oversight mechanisms to be crafted. Theoretically, executive branch 
oversight has the best chance of encouraging U.S. government 
agencies to disclose rather than stockpile vulnerabilities and of 
resetting the equities calculus between defense and offense. 
Additional oversight mandated by the President could reduce the 
number of vulnerabilities the U.S. government purchases. 
Alternatively, if oversight reduces exploitable vulnerabilities (by 
encouraging disclosure), but the government does not decrease 
purchasing, the government could function like a bug bounty, buying 
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vulnerabilities but ensuring most get disclosed and fixed.221  Dan Geer 
of In-Q-Tel, which has links to the CIA, has advocated this 
approach.222 However, if oversight encourages a reduction in 
government-purchased vulnerabilities, what happens to the 
vulnerabilities the government would have purchased is an open 
question. A decrease in U.S. government buying could reduce demand 
and lead gray-market companies to diversify product offerings or turn 
to white-market options. Or, gray-market companies may find foreign 
buyers less favorable to U.S. interests. 
 From the examined options, pursuing expanded executive branch 
oversight of zero-day use and procurement seems the most feasible 
and potentially effective option.  Such oversight would address U.S. 
government participation in the market, a critical component of the 
gray-market system, and represent a politically attainable and 
adaptable approach to regulating the zero-day trade.  However, 
executive branch oversight is opaque and may not increase public 
trust in how zero-days are handled.  Oversight of U.S. government use 
and procurement of zero-days also cannot address gray-market buyers 
and sellers beyond U.S. borders. The zero-day market is manifestly 
global, and the United States would have no guarantee that allies or 
foes would follow U.S. restraint. The next part addresses this 
weakness of domestic mechanisms and investigates prospects for 
international strategies to control the zero-day vulnerability trade. 
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING THE TRADE IN 
ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITIES 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The global nature of the zero-day problem means collective action 
strategies should be analyzed. The strategies examined in this article 
reflect the range of mechanisms available for international 
cooperation, including binding international law, voluntary 
coordination, and collective action among allies. The strategies were 
chosen to reflect, where possible, policy options under consideration. 
For example, a policymaker engaged with this issue indicated that the 
Wassenaar Arrangement (analyzed below) was being discussed as a 
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collective action strategy for zero-days in September 2013. 
 
B. Using International Law to Regulate the Zero-Day Trade 
1. International Law as an Instrument of International Governance 
 International law is an important instrument of international 
governance, with its distinguishing feature being the binding nature of 
the commitments it facilitates. Although not always successful, states 
use international law to facilitate cooperation on problems of mutual 
interest requiring coordinated action. The global nature of the zero-
day trade, and the global effects of countries’ zero-day decisions, 
raises the need to think about collective action through international 
law as one way to regulate the trade. 
 
2. Controversies Concerning International Law in Cyberspace: The 
UN Governmental Group of Experts 
 
 Applying international law to cyberspace has been controversial, 
as illustrated by the deliberations of the UN Governmental Group of 
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 
(GGE).223 The GGE grappled with whether principles of international 
law apply to cyberspace. The first GGE in 2004 failed to produce any 
report.224 Subsequent meetings adopted reports, but the GGE did not 
reach agreement on application of international law to cyberspace. 
The 2012-13 report was heralded as a breakthrough when the GGE 
reached consensus that international law, including the UN Charter, 
applies to cyberspace.225  This report is considered the first time a UN-
level group reached consensus about norms for responsible 
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cyberspace behavior.226 The United States welcomed the report, saying 
it signaled that states must act in accordance with international law in 
cyberspace.227 However, agreeing that the UN Charter applies to 
cyberspace brings existing problems with this treaty (e.g., on the use 
of force) into the cyber realm and does not address how the cyber 
context challenges longstanding rules of international law. 
 The GGE could discuss how international law should inform 
regulation of the zero-day trade. This trade fits within the GGE’s 
mandate to explore developments with information and 
communications technologies affecting international security, and the 
GGE’s experience might give it more credibility than a new 
mechanism. However, consensus that international law applies in 
cyberspace does not provide much of a foundation on which to have 
productive discussions about the zero-day trade. This trade does not 
obviously violate principles of international law enshrined in the UN 
Charter, meaning states would need to negotiate specific rules to 
regulate this trade.228 That need raises questions about whether the 
GGE, which struggled simply to reach consensus on whether 
international law applied to activities in cyberspace, could negotiate 
tailored international rules to govern the zero-day trade.  
 
3. International Law and Internet Governance: The International 
Telecommunication Regulations 
 
 The Internet currently is governed through “multi-stakeholder 
processes,” which involve governmental, corporate, and civil society 
actors. These processes operate outside international legal 
frameworks in part to allow non-governmental actors to participate in 
ways not normally seen with international legal mechanisms. 
Advocates for the multi-stakeholder process, including the United 
States, have opposed bringing Internet governance under 
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international law and inter-governmental control. Other states, 
especially China and Russia, advocate for Internet governance to come 
under inter-governmental control by formal rules. 
 As global communications developed, global bodies instituted 
mechanisms to govern them, including the International 
Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), a binding treaty adopted in 
1988 by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).229 The 
ITRs came up for amendment in December 2012 at the ITU’s World 
Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT).  The 
Conference debated extending the ITRs to the Internet, a debate that 
involved deciding whether international law should play a more 
prominent role in Internet governance.   
 At WCIT, the United States argued that extending the ITRs to the 
Internet would undermine existing multi-stakeholder governance.230 
China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries, 
supported amending the ITRs to bring Internet governance within the 
treaty and closer to ITU control.231  The United States defeated a 
binding proposal, but a non-binding resolution gained majority 
support.  The United States rejected the entire outcome of the 
negotiations. WCIT ended with a sense that the advocates for greater 
state and inter-governmental control over Internet governance had 
momentum.  
 WCIT demonstrates another instance where nations struggled to 
gain consensus about applying international law to cyberspace. Using 
the ITRs or the ITU as a venue for negotiating international legal rules 
for the zero-day trade would face resistance, given the disagreements 
already experienced at WCIT. The revised ITRs, as a treaty, and the 
ITU, as a diplomatic venue, are too politically controversial, and are 
unlikely places to support development of international legal 
mechanisms for governing the zero-day trade.  
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4. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
 The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime seeks to 
harmonize national criminal law on cybercrime and strengthen 
international law enforcement cooperation on cybercrime, making it a 
direct application of international law to a cybersecurity problem. The 
Obama administration recently stated that the Convention was 
“effective in breaking down barriers to transnational cooperation” and 
the United States is “able to respond to potential threats more quickly 
and effectively than ever” as a result of this collaboration.232 Still, the 
Convention experiences serious problems. According to critics, the 
treaty achieved consensus by adopting broad definitions and including 
a plethora of requested items rather than focusing on consensus 
issues.233 The Convention also provides broad grounds for states 
parties to shirk obligations.234 
 Eleven Council of Europe members have not ratified the treaty.235 
Of non-Council members involved in the Convention’s activities, only 
6 of 17 ratified.236 Only 42 states in total have ratified the Convention, 
237 which represents approximately 20 percent of UN members. 
Goldsmith points to disagreements between Western and non-
Western states about Convention definitions and rules as reasons for 
lack of non-Western participation. Goldsmith takes lack of adoption 
by more Western states as a strong sign that “nations significantly 
disagree about what digital practices should be outlawed and are 
deeply skeptical about even the weakest forms of international 
cooperation in this area.”238 Even on an issue, such as cyber crime, 
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which harms all parties, an international legal approach has proved 
extremely difficult.  Goldsmith argues that this fact bodes poorly for 
cooperation on cyber issues more directly affecting sensitive issues of 
sovereignty or national security.239 
 One strategy for dealing with the trade in zero-day vulnerabilities 
through the Convention on Cybercrime might be to update Article 6, 
which requires parties to adopt legislation prohibiting “the 
production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or 
otherwise making available of” tools that can be used to commit cyber 
crimes.240  States parties could update this article to regulate directly 
the distribution of zero-day vulnerabilities.  Alternatively, the 
Convention could place restrictions or transparency obligations on 
governments purchasing vulnerabilities.  
 Working within an existing treaty carries advantages: the specific 
change is the focus of debate, not the form and purpose of the whole 
agreement.  However, the Convention was not designed with the zero-
day trade in mind.  Different countries have diverse zero-day use and 
purchasing behaviors, which would complicate negotiation and 
weakens incentives parties have to craft new obligations in this area. 
Additionally, the treaty was designed to harmonize cyber crime laws. 
Given how little national policy and law currently exists regarding 
zero-days, addressing this issue through an instrument focused on 
established criminal activities might be premature, even in trying to 
use the Convention as the basis for starting discussions.241 
 
5. International Law and Dual-Use Technologies – The Biological 
Weapons Convention 
 
 The zero-day problem involves the challenge of regulating a dual-
use technology, a problem states encounter in other technological 
contexts. International laws regulating science and technology 
associated with biological agents are perhaps the closest dual-use 
analogues for laws regulating cyber technologies. Both biology and 
cyber share hard-to-distinguish peaceful, defensive, and offensive 
uses.  Furthermore, technical “on-ramps” for both are low. 
Technological advances are making powerful tools available to more 
people than before in both domains. Both biology and cyber 
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technologies operate in contexts that make verification of the peaceful 
nature of research and development difficult to design and execute. 
Given these similarities, examining the use of international law to 
address biology as a “dual use” technology might provide insights on 
challenges facing use of international law to regulate the zero-day 
issue. Critical differences, exist, however, including that zero-days are 
discovered, not developed, and are used for espionage, not just 
military purposes, raising questions whether a Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC)-type strategy is appropriate, despite the 
similarities identified above. 
 The BWC constitutes a landmark attempt to use international law 
to prevent biological weapons proliferation. The treaty prohibits 
development, production, stockpiling, retention, or acquisition of 
biological agents and toxins in “types and quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful 
purposes.”242 The BWC also prohibits the development, production, 
stockpiling, retention, or acquisition of “[w]eapons, equipment or 
means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict.”243 States parties cannot transfer 
biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery 
the treaty prohibits.244  Article X provides that states should facilitate, 
and retain the right to, the exchange of information, equipment, and 
materials relating to using biological agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes.245  
 The BWC provides lessons for thinking about a zero-day trade 
treaty. The BWC experienced controversy about the scope of 
prohibited and permissible activities. The BWC addressed this 
problem with objective criteria, relying on analysis of types and 
quantities of biological agents to determine compliance. Still, events 
have challenged established definitions.  For instance, the Bush 
administration pursued what it called “biodefense research,” 
attempting to replicate an anthrax-dissemination weapon supposedly 
developed by Russia.  Although the administration claimed they only 
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wanted to understand the threat, critics pointed out that these 
activities could be considered an Article I violation.246 This episode 
demonstrated the increasingly controversial role of intent in assessing 
BWC compliance. A zero-day treaty would likely confront similar 
problems.  What criteria would be a zero-day equivalent for the BWC’s 
type and quantity criteria? Even distinguishing between dangerous 
and less dangerous vulnerabilities runs into problems, because 
vulnerabilities in seemingly mundane software (e.g., software running 
a printer or controlling heating/cooling) can be exploited to 
devastating effect. 
 Controversy surrounding Article X demonstrates that divergent 
economic and trade interests could also complicate a dual-use treaty 
on zero-days. Article X states that BWC parties will “facilitate, and 
have the right to participate in” transfer of biological technologies for 
peaceful purposes.247  Developing countries have sought formalization 
of this technology transfer, but developed states have resisted for 
nonproliferation and intellectual property reasons.248 With zero-days, 
a similar conflict between cyber “haves” and “have nots” could 
emerge.   
 The BWC also highlights the difficulties of building verification 
mechanisms into treaties on dual-use technologies.  Attempts to add 
confidence-building mechanisms to the BWC (e.g., increased 
transparency through reporting) have generally been unimpressive. 
Negotiations to adopt a binding verification protocol failed. With the 
definitional issues associated with dual-use activities and political 
resistance to verification mechanisms, it is difficult to see what other 
compliance-enhancing strategies might work.  Both of these issues are 
present with trade in zero-days; verification would likely be a major 
challenge for any zero-day treaty. 
 Most critically, the BWC attempts to eliminate a class of weapons 
while allowing peaceful research. It is not apparent what parallel aim a 
treaty on trade in zero-days would achieve. Zero-days cannot be 
eliminated in the same way that the BWC prohibits biological 
weapons; vulnerabilities are an inevitable part of software 
development. A treaty could only regulate purposeful discovery, 
distribution, and use. Further, zero-days are useful for purposes that 
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do not have biological parallels. Particularly, zero-days can be used in 
espionage and law enforcement investigations, not just military 
activities. States that find zero-days useful for these purposes might 
resist a treaty. As a dual-use issue, zero-days and their trade present 
problems that existing international law on dual-use technologies 
does not adequately address. 
6. Summary of an International Legal Approach to  
Trade in Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 
 An international treaty to regulate trade in zero-day vulnerabilities 
would bring the legitimacy often associated with negotiated, binding 
commitments.  A legally binding mechanism potentially increases cost 
of noncompliance with the regime.249 Given the verification issues that 
would emerge with dual-use zero-day vulnerabilities, a legally binding 
mechanism may be the only way to achieve reasonable expected 
adherence to an international control regime.250  
 An international legal approach to the vulnerability trade, 
however, is likely politically impossible.  States exhibit a “fundamental 
clash of interests” concerning activities in cyberspace251 (a reality 
Snowden exacerbated), making a binding zero-day mechanism 
unlikely. Existing controversies about how to apply, interpret, and 
enforce international law in cyberspace would complicate zero-day 
international law.  Moreover, the multi-stakeholder Internet 
governance approach and advocates for expanded governmental and 
inter-governmental control over the Internet would clash in any effort 
to develop an international legal approach to trade in zero-days. Last, 
even though biology and cyber are both dual-use technologies, 
biological weapons can kill people, but zero-day vulnerabilities 
cannot. This difference will affect state calculations when weighing 
international cooperation. 
 The nature of the zero-day trade also does not appear addressable 
in treaty form. A range of actors use zero-days for many purposes, a 
more complicated milieu than the state actors targeted by the BWC. 
Scope, definitional, and verification concerns would exist regarding 
any zero-day treaty. Although international law is versatile, its binding 
nature can deter states when complexity and uncertainty are 
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prominent elements of the problem. In such situations, states might 
prefer flexible, non-binding strategies, at least until a path to effective, 
binding commitments is clearer.  
 In addition to political conflict, economic concerns would affect 
formulation of a zero-day treaty. The zero-day trade is lucrative. As 
seen in the BWC context, balancing nonproliferation, development, 
and intellectual property interests of states parties is challenging, and 
states with strong zero-day industries and states without may disagree 
about whether and how to restrict access to zero-days.  
 
C. Voluntary Collective Action to Regulate the Zero-Day Trade: The 
Wassenaar Arrangement 
 
1. Voluntary Collective Action and the Zero-Day Trade 
 
 States can also choose to cooperate on issues in a nonbinding 
setting, allowing flexibility and fewer formal limits on sovereignty 
than international law. The Wassenar Arrangement (WA) is such a 
voluntary arrangement among a diverse group of countries, designed 
to harmonize export controls on conventional arms and dual-use 
technologies.252 The WA is a middle ground between uncoordinated 
national export policies and a treaty imposing binding obligations to 
harmonize export controls. Dual-use technologies, including 
encryption, have been on WA control lists for years.253 According to an 
off-the-record interview I conducted, policymakers were considering 
the WA as a potential option for controlling the zero-day trade in 
September 2013. Changes to the WA in December 2013 raised the 
question whether the WA applied to zero-day vulnerabilities. Given 
that the WA has been subject to zero-day specific debate, it is a 
particularly important option to investigate.  
 
2. Details of the Wassenaar Arrangement 
 The WA seeks to prevent destabilizing proliferation of 
conventional arms and dual-use technologies.254 The WA serves as an 
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information gathering and sharing mechanism, encouraging 
transparency about transfers.255 The WA maintains lists of controlled 
items, and members are expected to implement national laws 
consistent with these lists.256  WA members are asked to notify other 
members of certain transfers and denials of export licenses.257 
 At the WA’s heart are control lists for conventional arms and dual-
use goods. The dual-use list includes items ranging from components 
of marine and aviation navigation systems to information security 
tools.258 The WA updates the lists through a slow-moving review 
process.259 
 Wassenaar members cannot veto including or excluding items 
from the lists.260  The WA does not maintain a list of restricted 
countries and does not require reporting to the WA before export of 
goods.261  Instead, the WA requests aggregate, post facto notification 
of exports and license denials at regular intervals.262 This system 
allows national governments to retain discretion about whether to 
adhere to WA consensus.263 Since the WA is voluntary, the WA does 
not have formal compliance mechanisms.264  
 The WA has attempted to update procedures for controlling 
intangible technology transfer, especially as it included new cyber 
tools on its lists (see below). The group developed a Statement of 
Understanding on Intangible Technology, directed at closing “wide 
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discrepancies” among member practices.265 The WA group considered 
this effort a priority, because “lack of controls on intangible transfers 
very much undermined all of the other efforts of control.”266  
 
3. Challenges and Benefits of Multilateral Export Controls 
 Multilateral export controls offer advantages over national export 
controls, enabling coordination that achieves greater effectiveness 
than national-only approaches, particularly when actions of one state 
have little effect on the overall problem.267 However, countries have 
historically hesitated to place export controls under international law, 
preferring to cooperate voluntarily to maintain greater autonomy.268  
 Coordination of export controls also carries risk. 269 Multilateral 
export controls often involve parties with different interests, resulting 
in problems establishing, monitoring, and enforcing controls. For 
instance, it only takes one sale of a dual-use technology to undermine 
the objective of denying an adversary access to that technology. The 
difficulties of defining and enforcing definitions of dual-used items, 
the economic costs to participants of complying with controls, and the 
different interests of participants make effectiveness hard to create 
and sustain. Additionally, the costs of control often fall on the private 
sector, instead of governments.  
 Other challenges come from states targeted by the WA.  These 
states can perceive export controls as attempts by wealthy nations to 
restrict supply to raise prices.270  Restricting supply can also 
encourage indigenous development of restricted items and illicit 
activities to gain access to them.271 For instance, countries such as 
Egypt and Syria, if formally denied zero-days through the Wassenaar, 
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may turn instead to actors within their country or the black market. 
Even though a multilateral export control mechanism could prevent 
companies located in member states from doing bad things, the 
actions of targeted countries would be beyond the mechanism’s 
control.  
 Zero-day buyers and sellers are globally distributed. The 
repercussions of stockpiling can be felt globally, because an 
undisclosed vulnerability potentially puts every user of globally 
distributed software at risk. The wide dissemination of, and global 
participation in, the zero-day trade means that export controls must 
be multilateral in nature to curtail the trade. Additionally, 
multilateral export controls are trade-based mechanisms. In 
comparison with other international approaches to dual-use 
technologies (e.g., the BWC), multilateral export control mechanisms 
are built with trade in mind, making this approach relevant for 
dealing with trade in zero-days. 
 
4. Criticism of the Wassenaar Arrangement 
 The WA has been criticized for weakness and ineffectiveness and 
critiqued by developing countries as a way for developed nations to 
maintain a high technology monopoly.272 The WA has also been 
criticized for its inability to gain consensus. The WA includes 
members that do not agree on all aspects of security, with members 
Russia and the United States as a salient example.273 The WA’s 
reliance on majority rule and lack of a veto mechanism complicate 
achieving consensus.  Although perhaps politically necessary, the lack 
of a veto mechanism means that states with problems with the control 
lists have no way to express disapproval except through 
noncompliance, weakening the regime.274 The informal nature of the 
lists, which allow national discretion regarding implementation, also 
means compliance is not consistent.275 
 Another significant problem is undercutting. The WA requests 
aggregate sharing of information about exports every six to twelve 
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months, depending on the technology.276 The lack of time-sensitive 
data can result in negative consequences. For instance, members are 
asked to report denials of export licenses for certain items.277  This 
policy means that members who deny export permission signal to 
other members that “there may be an export opportunity available” 
and provides little opportunity for countries to exercise effective  
influence over other members’ export decisions.278  
 
5. Do Recent Wassenaar Arrangement Changes Apply to Zero Day 
Vulnerabilities? 
 
 In December 2013, member states amended the WA control lists 
to include “intrusion software.”  The original proposals for this change 
came from France and the United Kingdom.279 Privacy advocates 
worked to raise awareness in the French and British governments 
about the need to keep surveillance software from repressive regimes, 
human rights violators, and other bad actors.280 Initially, it seemed 
the changes might apply to zero-days. This section examines the 
conversation that occurred as relevant parties debated 1) whether or 
not the changes applied to zero-days and 2) the problems and benefits 
of such an application. This recent debate is a crucial to include when 
assessing the WA’s suitability as a potential control mechanism for 
zero-days. 
 The changes are difficult to parse.  Eric King of Privacy 
International was involved in advocating for the changes, but notes, 
“it took us about two weeks to figure out what it meant, and there’s 
still uncertainty and a number of other people will probably read into 
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them.”281 Sam Evans, a WA expert, agrees: “the language seems 
massively broad.”282 
 
Table 4: Wassenaar Arrangement Definition of Intrusion 
Software283 
 
“Software” specially designed or modified to avoid detection by ‘monitoring tools’, or to 
defeat ‘protective countermeasures’, of a computer or network capable device, and 
performing any of the following: 
a.  The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or 
the modification of system or user data; or 
 
b.  The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to 
allow the execution of externally provided instructions.
 
Table 5: Wassenaar Arrangement Controls Related to 
Intrusion Software284 
 
 4. A. 5. Systems, equipment, and components therefore, specially designed or 
modified for the generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with, 
“intrusion software”.  [Emphasis added] (73) 
 
 4. D. 4. “Software” specially designed or modified for the generation, operation or 
delivery of, or communication with, “intrusion software.” (74) 
 
 4. E. 1. c “Technology” for the “development” of “intrusion software.” (74) 
 
 The following interpretation represents the consensus of the civil 
society members interviewed for this article, on- and off-record, who 
were also involved with advocating for the changes. The changes 
sought to curb trade in software systems used 
to disseminate and implement “intrusion software,” including large-
scale, commercial surveillance tools. The intent was not to control 
dissemination of malware, root kits, or zero-day vulnerabilities that 
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can be components of surveillance software or legitimate security 
research tools.  
 King explains, “There is confusion between how intrusion software 
is defined [in the WA] and what is actually controlled.  The definition 
of intrusion software is broad, but that isn’t actually controlled. What 
is controlled are systems, equipment, and components, specially 
designed for the generation, operation or delivery of, or 
communication with, intrusion software. It’s targeting the complete 
package.”285  
 For instance, the changes would target products from companies 
such as the U.K.-based Gamma Group, which makes the FinFisher 
surveillance software enabling remote computer monitoring. It would 
also target the Italy-based Hacking Team, which sells the Remote 
Control System software enabling access to computers by taking 
advantage of vulnerabilities. CitizenLab suspects zero-day vendor 
VUPEN is Hacking Team’s primary vulnerability supplier.286 
 King adds, “As we understand it, the U.K. government had no 
intention of controlling zero-day exploits” through the recent changes, 
but interpretation is distinct from intent.287  King emphasizes, 
“Implementation is where the problems would be.”288  
 
Evans also points to implementation problems:   
 
The problem with all list-based mechanisms is the 
difficulty of moving between text and object.  There are 
different interpretations that the text controls this and 
not this.  It is difficult with cannons and tanks, more 
difficult with things like circuits and hardware, and 
super hard with software. But it is not impossible. It 
just means there is much more work that needs to be 
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done outside of the listing itself to make controls 
meaningful.289 
 
 When first released publicly, it seemed the changes might have 
intended to control exports of zero-day vulnerabilities and/or zero-
day exploits. Indeed, in the wake of the changes, VUPEN, a leading 
zero-day seller, indicated it considered the new restrictions applicable 
to its exploit products. It announced that it would restrict sales of 
exploits, supplying only approved government agencies in approved 
countries, and would automatically exclude countries subject to other 
European Union, U.S., or UN trade restrictions.290  
 King cast doubt on VUPEN’s analysis of the Wassenaar changes: 
“If they were actually controlled, they would not be as delighted as 
they appear to be. They would be in serious business trouble, their 
compliance costs would skyrocket, given their current client base.”291 
Rather, King argued, VUPEN may embrace the Wassenaar changes as 
a way to head off further, more specific zero-day regulation.  
 Despite King’s confidence that “if we keep the text as is, we’re 
fine,” the existing language raises questions.  It attempts to 
differentiate between, for instance, a root kit and the tool deploying 
the root kit. This difference matters because it determines the tools 
actually controlled by the change. In theory, this distinction regulates 
surveillance tools but not surveillance tool components. It would 
control the system using a zero-day vulnerability, but not the zero-day 
itself. This difference would mean security researchers could continue 
to use tools vital to their work, because they do not typically deploy 
the same large-scale systems as the targeted companies deploy.  
 Despite not targeting zero-days, the distinction may have 
secondary effects on zero-days.  For instance, VUPEN is suspected of 
supplying Hacking Team with zero-days.292  If Hacking Team’s market 
for surveillance systems decreases, they may not buy as many zero-
days, decreasing VUPEN’s customer base.  However, VUPEN appears 
to have many other clients besides surveillance-system sellers, 
particularly government clients, so these secondary effects on 
companies such as VUPEN may not be dramatic.  
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 The distinction also raises technical questions. When are lines of 
code “specially designed” for installation of intrusion software?  Is it 
just the line that says “install rootkit.exe” that is controlled?293  If so, 
the regulation would be meaningless, because such a line is easily 
added or removed. Is any program that includes an install line 
included? If so, the regulation is overbroad.  These examples are 
simple, because one line of code is often not the extent of installation 
architecture, but it demonstrates the point. Without greater regulatory 
and technical clarity about the distinction between peripheral 
software and components of intrusion software, the attempt to control 
digital surveillance tools may be thwarted or damage legitimate 
security research.294  
 
6. Analysis of the Wassenaar Arrangement and  
Trade in Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 
 
 One of the core problems with the zero-day trade is that some 
governments are concerned that vulnerability sellers might sell zero-
days to unfriendly governments or other end-users of concern.  This 
problem reflects the general dilemma the WA was set up to address: 
coordinate national export policies on dual-use technologies for 
national security purposes. The WA, then, is fit for the mission of 
regulating the zero-day trade. 
 As a potential platform for international governance of the zero-
day vulnerability trade, the WA offers various benefits.  Namely, it 
engages a wide swath of actors. A major limitation of unilateral U.S.-
based export controls is their lack of impact on the global nature of the 
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trade. The WA, by contrast, includes 41 states.295  In particular, the 
WA engages a “captive” audience. The WA does not need to attract 
new participants to address zero-days, because it can rely on existing 
membership and procedures. Although the WA does not include many 
confirmed purchasing governments, such as Israel, Brazil, and India, 
the WA includes many nations where major zero-day sellers are 
located, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Malta, 
and Italy.296   
 Organizationally, the WA is one of the only international 
mechanisms that could address the zero-day problem without 
significant institutional change. The WA offers an efficient forum for 
negotiations on export of zero-days, because it already exists, deals 
with export controls on dual-use technologies, and has already moved 
into the cybersecurity arena with controls on surveillance 
technologies.  
 Last, as a flexible mechanism, the WA has the potential to achieve 
international coordination without making unrealistic demands of 
participants. Its relatively low demands on sovereignty raise the 
likelihood that nations will constructively participate. Obtaining 
agreement to add an item to an existing mechanism will likely be 
easier than obtaining agreement to join a new, untested, potentially 
more stringent mechanism. 
 Despite these advantages, addressing the zero-day trade through 
the WA confronts difficulties.  Defining which aspects of a dual-use 
technology, especially a cyber technology, to control can be difficult, 
as demonstrated by the definitional challenges surrounding controls 
on intrusion software. Specifically, the WA would have to work to 
develop a definition that controls targeted items while allowing 
security research to continue. Security researchers play a legitimate 
and significant role in identifying vulnerabilities,297 including 
Heartbleed,298 and have historically opposed export controls as threats 
to their work. The WA would need to achieve a definition that exempts 
security research while still controlling targeted items.  
 The WA also encounters problems with national implementation. 
Members implement WA-issued guidelines on a national level, giving 
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the WA a flexibility that attracts participants, but could mean that 
countries control more or less than intended. King expressed concern 
about the former case: “I would be concerned the government would 
use such controls in a discretionary manner to go after people they 
don’t like, as we’ve seen some evidence of in the past.”299  Moreover, 
on a national level, implementing WA changes would encounter the 
suite of problems with domestic export controls identified earlier.  
  Similarly, the WA has little power to ensure compliance, another 
consequence of the WA’s non-binding flexibility. The WA’s existing 
compliance problems would likely be evident with zero-days, too. The 
lucrative nature of the vulnerability trade presents an economic 
opportunity for countries, encouraging member states to oppose 
inclusion of zero-days in the WA, or engage in noncompliance. Given 
the reputation of the WA as a relatively weak organization, pursuing 
international control through the WA could be criticized as ineffective. 
 Cyber technologies are inherently more difficult to control than 
large missile components, but some cyber technologies seem more 
easily controllable than others. For instance, the online nature of the 
zero-day trade and well-developed black market could make 
compliance with a WA-based control mechanism easy to fake. 
Changing the WA control list to include surveillance technologies 
attempted to address compliance issues by targeting weak parts in the 
chain between production and use. Surveillance technologies, unlike 
zero-days, involve meetings, on-site visits, telecommunications 
companies and in-country partners, equipment installation, software 
updates, and personnel training.300 “It’s a complete operation,” King 
says, “with multiple points for identification and control.”301  King 
expresses concern that trade in zero-days does not exhibit the same 
prolonged relationships between seller and client that have been 
useful in regulating information-based technologies. “A zero-day is 
something I can knock together in my bedroom and send to you,” 
King says.302 Controlling zero-days may present more challenges than 
the recent WA forays into controlling certain cyber tools. 
 Last, the WA is a supply-side solution.  It would regulate the 
behavior of a limited number of sellers. Other mechanisms have 
greater ability to affect demand-side behavior. For instance, a treaty 
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mechanism (see above) or collective defense organization (see below) 
could include restrictions on government purchasing and use of zero-
days.  The WA could nominally do this through a Statement of 
Understanding (a non-binding expression of common opinion), or a 
similarly low-impact mechanism, but this effort would not be as much 
in the spirit of the WA as it would be in the spirit of other 
mechanisms. However, as suggested elsewhere, restrictions on 
government behavior through other mechanisms may be politically 
difficult to obtain.  As such, the WA presents an attractive balance of 
multilateral practicality and reach as an international option for 
controlling the zero-day vulnerability trade, despite its problems. 
 
D. Collective Defensive Organizations and the Zero-Day Trade: The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
 Collective defense organizations have become increasingly 
concerned about cybersecurity.  Particularly after the 2007 Estonia 
cyberattacks, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
developed organizational structures and policies for cyber defense.303 
Given interest in cyber issues by such organizations, this section 
analyzes the potential of collective defense organizations as forums for 
achieving international control of the zero-day trade. Collective 
defense organizations offer the benefits of closer thinking among 
allies, strong organizational and historical basis for cooperation, and 
the continued need to engage constructively with other member states 
on security issues. This section focuses on NATO, which, given its 
membership, history, and structure, is arguably the leading collective 
defense organization in the world. NATO has made an explicit effort 
to integrate cyber issues into its collective defense mission. 
Additionally, NATO’s membership includes many known government 
buyers and gray-market sellers.  
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1. NATO: Background and Cyber Defense Activities 
a. Background 
  NATO is the primary Western collective defense organization.  
Formed in World War II’s aftermath, the alliance sought to deter 
expansion of Soviet influence and encourage European integration.304 
With 28 member nations, NATO is treaty-based, and its central 
missions are collective defense and cooperative security.305 After the 
Soviet Union’s fall, NATO found new challenges in maintaining a 
unified Europe, including dealing with the breakup of former Soviet 
states, and focused on more global matters, including piracy off the 
Horn of Africa and terrorism.306  
 
b. Cyber Defense 
 The 2007 Estonia attacks were NATO’s cyber awakening.  In this 
incident, Estonian government, commercial, and news web 
capabilities were taken down by cyber attacks in response to 
controversy about moving a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn. The 
Estonia attacks demonstrated to NATO the “technical scale and 
political implications of potential cyber attacks.”307 The 2008 
Bucharest Summit addressed these implications.  NATO established 
two institutions: the Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA) 
and the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence 
(CCDCOE).308 The CDMA helps coordinate member state cyber 
defense, reviews capabilities, and conducts risk management. The 
CCDCOE helps improve cyber defense cooperation through research, 
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information sharing, and convening thought leaders. For instance, in 
2009, the CCDCOE requested that experts analyze how international 
law applies to cyber warfare.309 Although the resulting 2013 report is 
not official doctrine, it provides important analysis about how NATO 
members might think about international law, conflict, and 
cyberspace.310 
 In June 2011, NATO adopted the Cyber Defense Policy and Action 
Plan, the most advanced step in the maturation of NATO’s cyber 
capabilities.311 The document enumerated steps to enhance the 
political and operational readiness of NATO to respond to cyber 
incidents, including defining minimum requirements for the security 
of national networks critical to NATO’s operations.312  The CDMA 
transitioned to a group called the Cyber Defense Management Board, 
which has been carrying out the Action Plan.313  The 2012 Chicago 
Summit reaffirmed these efforts, and NATO Defense Ministers met for 
the first time in 2013 to focus exclusively on cyber defense.314 
 
c. NATO’s Offensive Cyber Debate 
 NATO’s cyber strategy focuses on defense.315 Even though NATO is 
a military organization, NATO’s leadership “has not yet discussed, let 
alone authorized, the development of offensive capabilities, doctrine, 
or rules of engagement in the cyber realm.”316 Meanwhile, the United 
States, China, and Russia seem to increasingly rely on a wide range of 
cyber capabilities, including offensive tools – some utilizing zero-day 
 
 
 
 
309 The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, NATO 
COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (2013), 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html. 
310 Id; Fidler et al., supra note 306, at 16. 
311 Healey & van Bochoven, supra note 307, at 3. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. 
314 Fidler et al., supra note 306, at 6; Defense Ministers Make Progress on Cyber 
Protection, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_101143.htm. 
315 Healey & van Bochoven, supra note 307, at 6. 
316 Fidler et al., supra note 306, at 24; Healey & van Bochoven, supra note 307, at 6. 
2015] FIDLER 477 
 
vulnerabilities – responding to mounting geopolitical tensions 
affecting cyberspace.317  
 NATO members, however, are “extraordinarily sensitive to the 
alliance having any offensive cyber capabilities or even discussing the 
need to think about the value of cyber capabilities and operations in 
missions NATO might undertake,” as NATO has done with previous 
technological developments affecting its mission.318  Some of this 
hesitancy stems from NATO members with cyber capabilities not 
wanting to share with less cyber-capable alliance partners. 
Additionally, the Snowden disclosures adversely affected prospects for 
advancing NATO discussions about offensive cyber capabilities 
because of increased mistrust toward the United States, particularly 
after revelations of U.S. spying on NATO allies.319 
 The closest NATO has come to addressing offensive capabilities 
was during the 2011 Libyan campaign. The Obama administration 
considered “a cyberoffensive to disrupt and even disable the Qaddafi 
government’s air-defense system.”320 Administration officials 
ultimately decided against the plan.321  Had the plan been adopted, the 
debated cyber offensive would likely have been conducted separately, 
supporting NATO’s mission, but not embedded within NATO’s chain 
of command.322 Recently, Russia reportedly used cyber tactics to 
disconnect Ukrainian forces from command and control as Russian-
affiliated forces entered Crimea,323 demonstrating that adversaries of 
NATO members are developing sophisticated military cyber 
capabilities. Cyber seriously affects NATO interests, and at some 
point, NATO must confront the issue of offensive capabilities.  
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 Equipping NATO with both offensive and defensive capabilities 
has advantages, but it could also fuel the perceived global “cyber arms 
race.”324 Perhaps NATO’s defense-focus carries advantages of 
signaling restraint. Alternatively, offensive technologies are integral to 
cyberspace agility, and, if NATO remains a cyber defense-only 
organization, its capabilities could fall behind the global technological 
curve.325 NATO has the potential to have significant influence in global 
cybersecurity, but it must be empowered to play both halves of the 
game.326 
 
2. Analysis of NATO as an Institution for Zero-Day Trade Discussions 
 NATO is an influential body, and, if it addressed trade in zero-
days, its policies would have global importance. NATO has been 
relatively successful in addressing new collective defense challenges, 
so it may have the institutional flexibility to take on zero-days. NATO 
membership maps well with participants in the zero-day market, 
including countries with notable buyers and sellers. Additionally, 
because NATO is a collective defense organization for allies, 
conceptions of the underlying security problem and opinions about 
approach may be more aligned than among states not engaged in 
collective defense. Given the difficulties of other forms of international 
cooperation, achieving consensus among allies might be strategically 
attractive.  
 NATO has developed a focus on cyber defense, and zero-days are 
relevant to that agenda.  Not only could trade in zero-days facilitate 
attacks against NATO networks, but the stockpiling behavior of 
member states also leaves other members vulnerable. Key NATO 
members, such as the United States and United Kingdom, are 
purchasers of zero-days.327 NATO’s commitment to cyber defense has 
resulted in the development of a cyber policy- and decision-making 
structure and processes that could also be used to address the zero-
day issue without significant alteration.  
 Despite this institutional base, NATO would have to experience a 
policy shift before addressing zero-days.  Zero-days are inherently 
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exploitable: although they have significant implications for cyber 
defense, they are also closely tied with offensive capabilities of 
member states and the potential for NATO offensive capabilities.  
NATO, as an organization, is currently not positioned to discuss 
offensive cyber issues and has demonstrated wariness of an expanded 
cyber mandate. Still, as demonstrated by Libya and Russia’s actions in 
Crimea, cyber is an increasing reality of security threats facing NATO. 
NATO must address cyber capabilities, not just passive cyber defense. 
Zero-days, as a technology that overlaps both categories, could be a 
useful place to start this shift.  
 If this shift occurred, NATO could use its existing structure to 
foster guidelines for addressing zero-days. The Cyber Defense 
Management Board (CDMB), which implemented the 2011 Action 
Plan, could be a starting place for discussions about zero-day policy.  
NATO could do this in several ways, including using CDMB to 
increase transparency and information sharing about zero-day issues 
within member states.   
 For instance, NATO could establish zero-day a threat-sharing 
program, in which governments share information about the nature of 
the zero-day threats they face.  This kind of program would probably 
be least resisted by member states, but NATO could go further. NATO 
could institute a group disclosure program: when one member 
stockpiles a vulnerability, it could also disclose the vulnerability to a 
NATO clearinghouse. NATO members could then protect themselves 
against that vulnerability or make use of it. NATO could also push for 
harmonized purchasing policies, perhaps agreeing that NATO 
members will only purchase or stockpile certain vulnerabilities from 
certain countries or suppliers.  
 However, given NATO’s lack of appetite for discussing offensive 
capabilities, NATO can, at best, function as a place to start a 
conversation among likeminded states. For instance, the CDMB could 
facilitate discussion of the zero-day issue at the next NATO defense 
ministers meeting.  But even that, as demonstrated, may be a difficult 
topic to broach. NATO simply may not be ready to address something 
as complex and controversial as the zero-day trade.  
eNATO is also not an entity designed for addressing trade in dual-use 
technologies. It could discuss zero-days, particularly government use 
and purchasing of zero-days, but it is not designed to influence global 
trade. NATO has only 28 members; even though many members are 
active buyers or host active sellers, and may share enough interests to 
come to consensus, an agreement among a limited group could only 
produce governance of limited global effect.  
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 Moreover, despite being composed of allies, NATO faces 
fragmentation of member policies and opinions.  NATO members 
sometimes have domestic political or legal constraints affecting NATO 
decisions, and the complicated legal ecosystem affecting NATO, made 
up of national law, transnational law, and international law, creates 
legal divergence.328 As indicated by post-Snowden wariness, NATO 
members do not always share consensus on what activities, 
particularly in cyberspace, are permissible under international law, 
especially when activities touch sovereignty and non-intervention 
issues.329 Last, in 2014, NATO has been preoccupied with the 
Ukrainian crisis.  Even though cyber played a role in the Ukrainian 
crisis, the cyber threats are marginal compared to the kinetic, 
territorial, and political security threats posed by Russian behavior.  
 
E. Summary of International Legal Approaches 
 This section investigated international law, voluntary collective 
action mechanisms, and collective defense organizations as possible 
approaches to regulating the international zero-day trade. These 
international mechanisms display two broad challenges of controlling 
the zero-day problem. The first challenge deals with the nature of the 
zero-day trade and applies to all international approaches. Defining 
which elements of the zero-day trade would be restricted (including 
technical details) is challenging, especially doing so in a way that 
would allow legitimate security research. Furthermore, the zero-day 
trade has few “choke points,” in contrast with other cyber 
technologies. Transfer can happen quickly and without sustained 
contact between buyer and seller. This feature of the zero-day trade 
makes verification of compliance with international mechanisms 
difficult.  
 The second challenge relates to the forms of the examined 
approaches. Organizational benefits and downsides vary between the 
options. An international law approach offers legitimacy, seriousness, 
and higher expected compliance. However, given current tensions 
regarding the application and interpretation of international law in 
cyberspace, a binding mechanism would face political opposition. The 
lucrative nature of the zero-day trade would likely also generate 
economic opposition to legally binding regulations. The potential 
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resistance to a binding mechanism suggests that such a mechanism 
may not garner much support and adherence. Questions also exist 
about fit: is there a clear subset of the zero-day problem that could be 
addressed by a binding legal mechanism, or is the technical and 
political complexity of the trade suited to a more flexible mechanism? 
 Collective defense organizations offer, in some ways, different 
features from an international law approach.  Although treaty-based, 
using a collective defense organization such as NATO to address the 
zero-day problem would mean working among states committed to 
preserving collective interests; political conflict would likely be less 
and cooperation higher. NATO offers a policy and decision-making 
infrastructure experienced with cyber issues. This infrastructure could 
be used to address the zero-day issue with little modification. 
However, NATO has not yet addressed policy matters beyond passive 
cyber defense. To address zero-days, NATO would have to undergo an 
organizational and policy shift, not an easy change.  
 The Wassenaar Arrangement, a voluntary, collective export 
control mechanism, seems a better fit for regulating the zero-day 
trade. Designed to deal with trade issues, the WA has policies and 
structures that could be adapted to the zero-day problem. The WA 
also has experience dealing with adding new cyber technologies to its 
control lists. The WA has the potential for relatively high adoption, 
given its flexibility and the experience WA members have with 
implementing updated WA control lists. However, under the WA, 
member states are responsible for implementing the WA control lists.  
This approach gives states flexibility to decrease or increase the 
strictness of controls, potentially resulting in harmful discrepancies in 
zero-day policy.  
 In sum, definitional and verification challenges extend across all 
mechanisms, while organizational fit varies. NATO offers an 
interesting possibility of effective collective action among a small 
group of likeminded states. However, given the organizational 
limitations of NATO – the bias towards defense – voluntary collective 
action through export controls using the WA seems to offer the best 
chance for collective action on controlling the trade. Still, the WA has 
severe drawbacks. Specifically, care would be needed in addressing 
definitional, verification, and implementation challenges. Despite 
these challenges, the WA offers a workable, existing organizational 
structure and a way to reach a critical mass of participating nations. 
The WA seems the most conceptually plausible and politically possible 
of the international policy options available. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Current national and international approaches towards zero-day 
vulnerabilities and their trade embody confusion, controversy, and 
competition far more than consensus on the cybersecurity threats the 
zero-day problem creates. Despite lack of consensus, the adverse 
consequences of the problem are severe enough to have already 
sparked debate. This article contributes to this debate by suggesting 
the best national strategy is improved executive branch oversight of 
U.S. zero-day policies. This approach builds on existing capabilities 
and the U.S. government’s declared bias for disclosure, is politically 
feasible, and can be calibrated to address changing government needs. 
For example, executive branch monitoring, review, and disclosure of 
post-use or post-stockpiling of zero-day vulnerabilities could provide 
oversight of purchased vulnerabilities and ensure the U.S. government 
continuously addresses the use-versus-disclosure calculus. 
 The zero-day market and its problems are global, requiring 
collective action. This article concludes that using the Wassenaar 
Arrangement to harmonize export controls on zero-day vulnerabilities 
appears the most realistic and suitable international strategy. The WA 
deals with trade-related security issues and would not need 
institutional alteration. The Arrangement includes many confirmed 
buyer and seller nations and is large enough to achieve impact on the 
zero-day problem through collective action. However, U.S. leadership 
is required to catalyze international cooperation. To achieve such 
cooperation, the United States would need to establish policy clarity, 
signaling to other nations its seriousness about collective action. As 
Clarke and Swire argued, because international cooperation is 
currently unlikely, the United States should “step up its efforts” and 
create “the basis for an international norm of behavior.”330  
 The solutions presented here do not solve all problems associated 
with the zero-day trade. For instance, analysis of the zero-day trade 
suffers because of market opacity. We need better data to inform how 
to regulate this trade. Strengthening executive branch oversight and 
pursuing collective action through the WA would have some 
transparency-enhancing effects. These strategies would test the U.S. 
government’s commitment to its policy announcements about zero-
days, and increased government transparency might increase pressure 
on sellers to be more transparent. Better information from 
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governments and sellers will help determine whether further 
regulation is needed. We must continue to revisit how to approach the 
zero-day trade as new information emerges. 
 On the international side, the WA provides a politically and 
substantively workable approach to the zero-day trade, but even this 
strategy leaves many actors beyond its reach. For instance, using the 
WA would not directly affect China’s policies and practices concerning 
zero-day purchases, if any, it makes on the international or domestic 
gray market.  
 Beyond purchased zero-days, in-house capabilities of foreign 
governments, including China, to discover zero-days pose a serious 
problem. Nations may build initial cyber capabilities by purchasing 
zero-days from the gray market, but many will eventually develop 
internal capabilities and decrease their reliance on the market.331 
Regulation of the gray market may speed up this process. Greater 
reliance on in-house capabilities would mean zero-day use would 
become even more difficult to address, particularly through collective 
action. Regulating legal trade in zero-day vulnerabilities is one 
problem, but grappling with threats crafted in secret using dual-use 
cyber tools, beyond effective reach of international action, constitutes 
an entirely different challenge.  
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